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Case No. 20090396 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Richard Donald Cooper, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for four counts of knowingly filing a 
wrongful lien, a third degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Defendant recorded a "consent judgment," in the Utah County Recorder's 
Office, that falsely asserts four different individuals, including Fourth Judicial 
District Court Judge Lynn Davis, agreed that they were jointly and severally liable 
for 4.2 million dollars. State's Exh. # 1 (capitalization omitted). The consent 
judgment incorporated an "administrative judgment," which made similar 
allegations, that Defendant had earlier recorded on behalf of his son. State's Exh. # 
2 (capitalization omitted).1 
1. Did the trial court properly take judicial notice of the judicial action of 
another court declaring the administrative judgment a wrongful lien? 
Standard of Review. "[T]rial courts have broad discretion to determine whether 
to take judicial notice of a fact/7 Gallegos ex rel. Rynes v. Dick Simon Trucking, Inc., 
2004 UT App 322, \ 8,110 P.3d 710. 
2. Did the trial court properly deny Defendant's request for a mistrial based 
on Judge Lynn Davis's testimony? 
Standard of Review. "The decision to grant or deny a mistrial. .. rests within 
the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of 
discretion/" State v. Dominguez, 2003 UT App 158, ^  39,72 P.3d 127 (quoting State v. 
Calhham, 2002 UT 86, If 42, 55 P.3d 573). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Copies of the following statutes and rules are attached in Addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 38-9-1, 76-6-503.5 (West Supp. 2009-2010), and Utah R. Evid. 
201. 
1
 The exhibits are contained in a manilla envelope. See R1164. Copies of the 
consent and administrative judgments are attached in addendums B-C, respectively. 
? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with four counts of knowingly filing a wrongful lien, 
a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-503.5 (West Supp. 
2010-2011), and four counts of retaliation against a witness, a third degree felony, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-508.3 (West 2004). R199-200. The State 
dismissed the witness retaliation counts. See R1273:4-5. Following a two-day jury 
trial, Defendant was convicted as charged. See R969. The trial court imposed the 
statutory prison term of zero to five years for each count. See Rl 050-1051. The trial 
court then suspended the prison terms and placed Defendant on a 72-month 
probation term, which included 60 day's jail time. Id. at 1051. Defendant timely 
appealed. R1081-82. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Upset with the adverse result of a quiet title suit in which he was a named 
defendant, Defendant recorded a "consent judgment/' in the Utah County 
Recorder's Office. State's Exh. #1 (capitalization omitted). The consent judgment 
asserted that the husband and wife plaintiffs, their attorney, and the judge in the 
case, all agreed that they were jointly and severally liable for 4.2 million dollars in 
damages, and that if the debt was not discharged in 90 days, the consent judgment 
would "become a commercial lien.'" State's Exh. # 1-4; see also R1282:99-100,174-84. 
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The consent judgment incorporated an "administrative judgment" that Defendant 
had earlier recorded on behalf of his son, Jerry Cooper, another named defendant in 
the quiet title suit. State's Exh. #1 at 1-4 (capitalization omitted); see also State's Exh. 
# 2 and Defendant's Exh. #1. The administrative judgment made similar allegations 
against the plaintiffs, their attorney, and judge. Id.; State's Exh. #2. 
* * * 
Victims Richard and Mary Pace attended a Utah County tax sale in 1997, 
where they purchased a 63% interest in a laundromat located in Provo, Utah. 
R1166:114-115,189491, 205. When the Paces tried to inspect the laundromat, they 
were confronted by a metal sign reading: "Friends only are welcome. All public 
officials and others shall not enter nor interfere without court order. Threat or use 
of force may be used to prevent or terminate . . . unlawful entry or interference." Id. 
at 194. Given these warnings, the Paces did not enter the property then, or at any 
other time over the next eleven years. Id. The Paces, however, did pay the yearly 
property taxes on the laundromat, to maintain their 63% interest. Id. at 194-95. The 
Paces also hired Rodney Rivers, a real estate attorney, who filed a quiet title action 
on their behalf. Id.; see also id. at 119-123. 
Before filing suit, attorney Rivers performed a title search to discover all the 
individuals who could possibly claim an interest in the laundromat. Id. at 115,118-
4 
119. Both Defendant's and his son Jerry's names came up in connection with the 
laundromat. Id. The Paces, through attorney Rivers, tried to correspond with 
Defendant at a Post Office box in Arizona —the only address listed on some of the 
documents recorded with the county recorder. Id. at 119,121. When those efforts 
proved unsuccessful, the Paces decided to pursue litigation. Id. at 119-120. With "so 
many different documents. Some of them ... clearly gibberish/7 attorney Rivers 
believed that the only way the Paces "could work out who owned what" was to 
have a "judge decide." Id. at 120. Both Defendant, and his son Jerry were named as 
defendants in the Pace's civil suit. See id. at 121-22,155. 
The Paces's quiet title action was heard by Judge Lynn Davis. Id. at 147-49. 
Since the Paces were unable to locate and personally serve Defendant, the court 
authorized attorney Rivers to mail a copy to the only available address, and to 
publish notification in the local newspaper. Id. at 121-22. Defendant did not 
respond to the service of process, or otherwise appear in the quiet title case. Id. at 
124-25. 
Defendant's son Jerry, on the other hand, filed several documents in the case 
on behalf of himself and various trusts listed on the documents. Id. at 123,125-26, 
156. Attorney Rivers objected to anything filed on behalf of corporate entities for 
lack of legal representation. Id. at 126, 156. Judge Davis granted the defendants 
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several extensions of time to secure counsel. Id. at 156. In January 2004, Judge Davis 
granted a motion to strike all of Jerry's answers for failure to obtain legal 
representation "and fail[ure] to honor the requests of the Court." Id. at 157. Judge 
Davis then entered default judgments against both and Defendant and Jerry. Id. at 
125,157-58. 
Approximately eight months after the default judgment was entered, Jerry 
drafted the "administrative judgment" that he had Defendant record at the Utah 
County Recorder's Office. State's Exh. # 2 (capitalization omitted); see also 
R1282:182-183. The administrative judgment, recorded on 15 November 2004, 
declared that Mary Pace, Richard Pace, attorney Rivers, and Judge Davis were 
jointly and severally liable for 4.2 million dollars. See State's Exh # 2 at 1, 11. In 
January 2007, approximately three years after the quiet title judgment was entered, 
Defendant drafted and recorded a document entitled "consent judgment," which 
referenced and incorporated the previously recorded administrative judgment. 
State's Exh # 1 (capitalization omitted); see also R1166:129; 1282:184. The consent 
judgment names the Paces, attorney Rivers, and Judge Davis as debtors and states 
that they "agree that $4,200,000.00 constitutes the total amount due and owing, by 
Debtors, severally and jointly." State's Exh. # 1 at 3-4; see also id. at State's Exh. #2 at 
11. The consent judgment also "provides 90 days to discharge the 'account 
6 
receivable' or the account become [sic] a 'commercial lien.'" State's Exh. # 1 at 4. 
Defendant sent copies of the consent judgment to the Paces, attorney Rivers, and 
Judge Davis.2 R1282:185. 
Neither the Paces, attorney Rivers, nor Judge Davis had contractual 
obligations to Defendant, nor did they otherwise owe him money for which he 
would be entitled to record a lien. See R1166:130-31,151-52,195-96. 
At trial, the judge took judicial notice that the administrative judgment 
(State's Exh. # 2), referenced in the consent judgment (State's Exh. # 1 ) , had 
previously been determined by another court to be a wrongful lien: 
Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, the Court is taking judicial notice of 
a matter. I am taking judicial notice of the action of another court of 
this state. The document entitled "consent judgment" recorded on 
January 24, 2007, that's been received as Exhibit No. 1 contains a 
reference to a right in Administrative Judgment Claim AJ-27-21-98, 
dated 12 November 2004. 
You are hereby instructed that said document referenced therein as 
administrative judgment was determined previously by a court of 
competent jurisdiction of this state to be a wrongful lien. You may 
consider the previous decision of that court finding that the 
administrative judgment was a wrongful lien in your deliberations in 
this case. And you may give that previous decision the weight that 
you think it deserves. 
R1166:102-03. 
2
 The address Defendant used for Judge Davis was that of the Fourth District 
Courthouse. R1166:148. 
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Defendant adduced testimony from Lisa Garner, an "expert in real estate 
closing title matters/7 R1282:75. Garner performed title searches on the Paces' and 
attorney Rivers' homes and found no reference to either the administrative 
judgment or the consent judgment. Id. at 97. She also did a title search on the court 
building connected with Judge Davis's name and found no liens or encumbrances. 
Id. at 99. Although Garner did not run a title search on Judge Davis's home, Garner 
affirmed that she did not "believe that [she] would have found the administrative 
judgment and consent judgment, in relation to him." Id. at 100-01. However, 
because Judge Davis had sued to remove the administrative judgment and consent 
judgment, there was no way to know whether or not she would have found them if 
she had performed a title search on the judge's home. Id. 
On cross examination, Garner acknowledged that a member of the public 
could find the administrative judgment and consent judgment in a number of ways, 
but that they were not tied to any of the property addresses at issue. Id. at 105; see 
also id. at 109. Garner also acknowledged that it was possible to have a lien on 
personal property, and that she only deals with liens on real property. Id. at 112-13. 
Although Garner did not believe the consent judgment was valid, she 
acknowledged that a layperson might think it was a valid judgment. Id. at 118-19. 
And while Garner did not believe the consent judgment purported to put a lien on 
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real property, she did not know whether it purported to put a lien on personal 
property. Id. at 120-21. Finally, Garner acknowledged that if her company w a^s 
issuing a lender's policy to a hypothetical individual, and that individual's name 
came up on a document that purported to be a similar judgment for 4 million 
dollars, she would hesitate to issue the policy, because she "would have to make 
sure [it was the same individual] that we're insuring so that the lender's deed of 
trust is in first lien position and that this judgment doesn't attach to any property he 
takes." Id. at 125; see also id. at 126-28. She acknowledged that this situation could 
result in the policy not being issued. Id. at 128-29. Finally, Garner acknowledged 
that a layperson deciding whether to lend money to an individual could go to a 
county recorder's office to find "general background on the person and their 
financial condition." Id. at 133. 
Defendant testified that he missed paying only one year's taxes on the 
laundromat and that he never received notice of the tax deed sale. Id. at 174,189-90. 
According to Defendant, recording the administrative and consent judgments were 
steps in the process of preserving his and his son's civil right to "stop this action of 
taking the laundry through a phony tax deed sale." Id. at 183; see also id. at 184. 
Defendant opined that the consent judgment was really a complaint and that it had 
not been his intention to record a lien. Id. at 186. Finally, Defendant acknowledged 
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that he had had previous trouble with the law, including having been convicted for 
the felony offense of making a false income tax refund claim. Id at 187-88. 
On cross, Defendant acknowledged that he had actually been convicted of 
two felonies, the other conviction for making false claims to a government agency. 
Id. at 192. Defendant reiterated his belief that the consent and administrative 
judgments established that the victims owed him 4.2 million dollars. Id. at 192-94. 
Defendant acknowledged that he never had any business dealings with Judge 
Davis, attorney Rivers, or the Paces. Id. at 211. 
On redirect, Defendant opined that administrative and consent judgments did 
not create a lien, "but it says if you don't do something, it can become a lien. And 
they chose never to respond." Id. at 216. Defendant clarified, however, that "[w]e 
never followed up on anything yet/7 Id. 
On rebuttal, the State called an employee of the county auditor's office who 
verified that the 1997 tax sale wherein the Paces acquired a 63% interest in the 
laundromat was legitimate, see R1282:240-243, and that at the time of the tax sale, the 
taxes on the laundromat were delinquent by more than one year, see id. at 243-44. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point L Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in taking 
judicial notice of the wrongful-lien order because the order was not made part of the 
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record, the judicial notice instruction impermissibly went to the truth of the matter 
decided in the order, and the instruction failed to instruct jurors that the order was 
not conclusive. Defendant's assertions are precluded by the invited error doctrine. 
Defense counsel expressly requested that the wrongful-lien order not be submitted 
as an exhibit, and also declined the trial court's invitation to instruct jurors in the 
exact language of the judicial notice rule, which language would have cured the 
instructional errors of which he complains. 
Alternatively, even if Defendant did not invite the alleged errors regarding 
the wording of the judicial-notice instruction itself, they lack merit because they are 
based on a mischaracterization of the instruction. Contrary to Defendant's 
suggestion, the judicial-notice instruction complied with the requirements of rule 
201. It did not instruct jurors to notice the truth of the matter decided by the 
wrongful-lien order, nor did it instruct that the order was conclusive as to any fact 
or element. 
Finally, even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court abused its discretion in 
noticing the wrongful-lien order, Defendant has not shown, and cannot show on 
this record, a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome absent the judicial 
notice. The other evidence against Defendant was overwhelming. 
0
 D 
11 
Point II. The trial court properly denied a mistrial based on Judge Davis's 
testimony because defense counsel invited the vast majority of the challenged 
testimony on cross examination, and because curative instructions were given. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
a mistrial, Defendant has not shown a reasonable probability of a different outcome 
absent Judge Davis's challenged testimony, because the other evidence against him 
was overwhelming. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY TOOK JUDICIAL NOTICE OF 
THE JUDICIAL ACTION OF ANOTHER COURT DECLARING 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGMENT A WRONGFUL LIEN 
In Point I of his brief, Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its 
discretion in taking judicial notice that another court had ruled that the 
administrative judgment was a wrongful lien because: (1) the wrongful-lien order 
was not made part of the record; (2) the judicial-notice instruction went to the truth 
of the matter asserted in the wrongful-lien order, or to the ultimate question 
confronting the jury; (3) the judicial-notice instruction failed to instruct jurors that 
the wrongful-lien order was not conclusive; and (4) he was unfairly prejudiced by 
12 
the judicial notice.3 Aplt. Br. at 26-36. To the extent Defendant has not invited the 
errors of which he complains, they lack merit. 
Proceedings below. Defense counsel objected to a proposed jury instruction 
that the administrative judgment referenced in the consent judgment had, "in a civil 
action/' "been determined to be a wrongful lien." R1166:21; see also R862. Defense 
counsel objected to taking judicial notice of the prior wrongful-lien order because it 
was: (1) civil and thus a lower standard of proof applied; (2) a default judgment that 
was "not heard on the merits"; and (3) prejudicial in that "it [went] to the ultimate 
issue of fact in this case." R1166:22. The trial court ruled that it was proper to take 
judicial notice of the wrongful-lien order under rule 201, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
because it could not reasonably be questioned that another court had previously 
declared the administrative judgment a wrongful lien. Id. at 34-35. The trial court 
noted that rule 201(d) "indicates the Court shall take judicial notice if requested and 
supplied with the necessary information." Id. at 34. The trial court further ruled 
3
 Defendant uses phrases like "the truth of the matters asserted (or decided)," 
and "the ultimate question^ ] confronting the jury" interchangeably. See e.g. Aplt. 
Br. at 27-31. Because Defendant never cites to rules governing the admission of 
hearsay, see id., the State does not read Defendant's brief as raising a hearsay 
objection to the wrongful-lien order. Rather, the State assumes Defendant is 
asserting only that the trial court allegedly erroneously took judicial notice of the 
truthfulness of the wrongful-lien order, or of one of the ultimate facts confronting 
jurors in this case. 
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that it would instruct jurors consistent with rule 201 (g), "that the weight to be given 
to [the wrongful-lien order], if any, [was] solely for the jury to decide/' R1166:35. 
Rule 201(g) provides: "In a criminal case, the court shall instruct the jury that it 
may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed." The 
trial court offered to instruct the jury "in the exact language out of subsection (g ) . . . 
if counsel prefers that," but neither counsel so indicated. Id. at 34-35.4 
Before opening statements, defense counsel requested that the trial court only 
read, and not submit to jurors either the judicial-notice instruction or Judge Quinn's 
order declaring the administrative judgment a wrongful lien: 
In regards to the judicial notice of Judge Quinn's findings in regard to 
the administrative judgment, I would ask that that, . . . be something 
that be read to the jury and facts and not submitted as a jury 
instruction because a jury instruction may give it undue influence as a 
4
 There was some confusion below as to whether both the administrative and 
consent judgments had previously been declared wrongful liens. Two different civil 
orders were entered declaring the administrative judgment a wrongful lien: the first 
order was issued by Judge Quinn in July 2005, and the second order was issued by 
Judge Fuchs in October 2007. See R1166:32-33,71-72; R1282:68~69. Defense counsel 
received a copy of Judge Fuchs's order in discovery, but not, apparently, a copy of 
Judge Quinn's order. R1166:32-33. The trial court had a copy of Judge Quinn's 
order, which it provided to defense counsel. Judge Quinn's order was the basis for 
the judicial-notice instruction. Id. The trial court speculated that there was a typo in 
Judge Fuchs's order, which should have referenced the consent judgment, rather 
than the administrative judgment. See R1282:51-52. In any event, the prosecutor 
never sought to have the jury instructed that the consent judgment had also been 
declared a wrongful lien and the trial court did not do so. 
14 
matter of law when the Court is actually taking judicial notice of it as a 
fact. So I would ask that also be read to the jury and not something 
that is submitted as a jury charge. 
R1166:70. The prosecutor agreed, suggesting that the trial court take judicial notice 
of the wrongful-lien order during the testimony of the State's first witness, a 
representative from the county recorder's office. Id. at 70-71. 
The trial court sought clarification that defense counsel was "the one that 
suggested that it be — that the order be read rather than marked as an exhibit/' and 
defense counsel responded, "Correct." Id. at 72. The prosecutor explained that the 
parties were asking the trial court to only read the jury instruction, which referenced 
the wrongful-lien order, and that neither the jury instruction nor the wrongful-lien 
order should be submitted to jurors. Id. at 72-73. When the trial court expressed 
confusion as to whether the wrongful-lien order would be submitted as an exhibit, 
the prosecutor explained that he had planned to offer it, but had decided against 
doing so when defense counsel objected that it "would be improper for the jury to 
have that as an exhibit." Id. at 73. Defense counsel agreed that the prosecutor was 
asking the trial court to read, but not submit the written judicial notice instruction to 
the jury: "he's asking that the court read that to the jury instead oi the order 
. . . being admitted as an exhibit." Id. The trial court then indicated its 
understanding that neither the wrongful-lien order nor the judicial-notice 
15 
instruction would be submitted to jurors. Id. at 73-74. Defense counsel opined that 
withholding the wrongful-lien order and the judicial-notice instruction from jurors 
"would help hopefully fix the problem/' but that he was not "waiving any previous 
objection" to jurors being instructed that the administrative judgment was 
previously declared a wrongful lien. Id. at 74. 
Thereafter, the court orally instructed jurors that (1) the administrative 
judgment referenced in the consent judgment "was determined previously by a 
court of competent jurisdiction of this state to be a wrongful lien/7 (2) they "may 
consider the previous decision of that court finding that the administrative 
judgment was a wrongful lien in [their] deliberations," and (3) they "may give that 
previous decision the weight [they think] it deserves." Id. at 102-103. 
In closing argument, the prosecutor reminded jurors that the administrative 
judgment had been declared a wrongful lien: 
You were instructed by the Court to give weight, whatever weight that 
you felt proper to —to it, you were instructed by the Court in the 
beginning of this case, if you remember, that a court of competent 
jurisdiction of this state has determined that this document, the 
administrative judgment, is a wrongful lien. 
I'm sure you caught it when it came around. The consent judgment 
makes reference and if you read this and can understand it in the sense 
that — in — in any level that you can make sense of it, is all based upon 
this administrative judgment. It's there. 
16 
R1282:270. 
Defense counsel argued that the administrative judgment was a "frivolous" 
document unenforceable in a court of law, and that while it purported to create a 
right to a lien in the future if the victims did not pay, "[t] here's been no testimony 
whatsoever that the demands were made to pay, there's no testimony whatsoever 
that a lien has actually ever been filed." Id. at 283. Referring to both the 
administrative and consent judgments, defense counsel emphasized that "[t]hese 
documents talk about a right to [a lien], they don't say that it's actually there." Id. 
He also reminded jurors that they could read the judgment documents and decide 
for themselves whether they were wrongful liens; they did not have to accept — and 
should not accept—the civil court order declaring the administrative judgment a 
wrongful lien: 
You don't have to listen to what some judge said on a civil case that the 
administrative judgment was a wrongful lien, 'cause that was a civil 
case, that was a default judgment, not heard on its merits and the 
standard of proof is preponderance of evidence. No one contested it, 
judgment so ordered. That's what happens in civil court, it doesn't 
happen in criminal court. You are the fact finders. You are the judges 
of the evidence. You apply the law, the facts to the law. 
Id. at 283-84. 
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A. Defendant's assertions constitute invited error. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in taking judicial 
notice of the wrongful-lien order without also making the order part of the record, 
see Aplt. Br. at 26-33, and in failing to comply with rule 201(g), Utah Rule of 
Evidence, by instructing jurors regarding the " truth of the matters asserted" in the 
wrongful-lien order and "failfing]" to . . . instruct the jury that they need not accept 
the judicially noticed fact as conclusive." Aplt. Br. at 19, 31-32. These claims 
constitute invited error. As shown, defense counsel expressly requested that the 
wrongful-lien order not be submitted as an exhibit. SeeRl 166:70-74. And when the 
trial court offered to instruct jurors "in the exact language" of rule 201(g), defense 
counsel chose to remain silent. See id. at 34-35. 
Utah's "invited error doctrine arises from the principle that a party cannot 
take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committing the error." Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ^ 17,164 P.3d 366 (quoting State 
v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ^ 15, 128 P.3d 1171 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted)); see also State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) (same). "By 
precluding appellate review, 'the doctrine furthers this principle by "discouraging 
parties from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden 
ground for reversal on appeal."'" Pratt, 2007 UT 41, ^ 17 (quoting State v. 
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Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16,112,86 P.3d 742). A defendant is "'not entitled to both the 
benefit of not objecting at trial and the benefit of objecting on appeal/" Id. (quoting 
State v. King, 2006 UT 3, f 13,131 P.3d 202) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted); see also State v. Bullock 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989) ("[W]e do not 
appraise all rulings objected to for the first time on appeal under the plain error 
doctrine. . . . [I]f trial counsel's actions amounted to an active, as opposed to a 
passive, waiver of objection, we may decline to consider the claim of plain error"). 
Rather, the invited error doctrine encourages counsel "'to actively participate in all 
proceedings and to raise any possible error at the time of its occurrence," thereby 
"fortifying] our long-established policy that the trial court should have the first 
opportunity to address a claim of error/" Pratt, 2007 UT 41, f 17 (quoting State v. 
Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f 15, 128 P.3d 1171) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
Here, defense counsel objected to the trial court taking judicial notice of the 
wrongful-lien order. But when that objection proved unsuccessful, defense counsel 
expressly requested that the wrongful-lien order not be submitted to jurors as an 
exhibit. See R1166:70-74. Defense counsel's request affirmatively invited any 
possible error in taking judicial notice of the wrongful-lien order without submitting 
it to jurors or otherwise making it part of the record. See State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, 
19 
Tf Tf 62-63,114 P.3d 551 (declining to review claimed instructional error where Pinder 
"signal[ed] by an affirmative act that he had no objection"). 
Additionally, the trial court proposed to instruct jurors that they may give the 
wrongful-lien order the weight they thought it deserved, but also offered to instruct 
jurors "in the exact language out of subsection (g) . . . if counsel prefers that." 
Rl 166:34-35. Rule 201(g) requires that, in a criminal case, "the court shall instruct 
the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially 
noticed." Utah R. Evid. 201(g). Rather than accept the trial court's invitation to 
parrot the language of rule 201(g) in giving the judicial-notice instruction, defense 
counsel chose to remain silent. Id. Had defense counsel accepted the trial court's 
invitation, it would have cured the errors he now challenges on appeal. Defense 
counsel's silence thus affirmatively invited any possible error in the judicial-notice 
instruction. See Finder, 2005 UT 15, f % 62-63. 
As a consequence, Defendant's claims that the wrongful-lien order should 
have been made part of record, and that the judicial notice instruction was 
erroneous because jurors were not instructed "that they need not accept as 
conclusive the fact the 'Administrative Judgment' was a wrongful lien," Aplt. Br. at 
31, are precluded by the invited error doctrine. See State v. Perry, 2009 UT App 51, f 
10, 204 P.3d 880 (declining plain error review where counsel conceded evidentiary 
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hearing could be held in Perry's absence); see also Winfteld, 2006 UT 4, f 13,128 P.3d 
1171 (declining to review jury selection process for plain error, where Winfield, 
acting pro se, affirmatively approved panel). 
B. Alternatively, the judicial-notice complied with rule 201. 
In any event, Defendant's claims regarding the judicial-notice instruction lack 
merit because he mischaracterizes the instruction given. The judicial-notice 
instruction did not instruct jurors to notice the truth of the matter decided in the 
wrongful lien order, nor did it instruct jurors that the order was conclusive as to any 
fact or element. Defendant thus fails to show any abuse of the trial court's 
discretion in judicially noticing the wrongful-lien order, or in instructing the jury. 
Rule 201, Utah Rules of Evidence, authorizes courts to take judicial notice of 
"adjudicative facts." Utah R. Evid. 201(a). Adjudicative facts are "the true facts that 
are used in the adjudication of a controversy." Utah R. Evid. 201 Adv. Comm. Note. 
Under rule 201, "[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable 
dispute in that it is . . . capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to 
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Utah R. Evid. 201(b)(2).5 
5
 Courts may also notice a fact "not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is 
. . . generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court," Utah R. 
Evid. 201(b)(1), but the trial court did not rely on this provision and the State does 
not assert it as an alternative ground for affirmance. 
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As noted, the rule further directs that "[i]n a criminal case, the court shall instruct 
the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially 
noticed/' Utah R. Evid. 201(g). 
Utah's rule 201 "is the federal rule, verbatim." Utah R. Evid. 201 Adv. Comm. 
Note. Federal courts "notice the records of any court, state or federal." 21B 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 5106.4, 230 (2d ed. 2005). However, federal courts generally "take 
notice of another court's order only for the limited purpose of recognizing the 
'judicial act' that the order represents or the subject matter of the litigation." United 
States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549,1553 (11th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases); see also State v. 
Silva, 926 A.2d 382,384-387 (N.J. Super. 2007) (reversing trial court order in criminal 
case noticing truth of another judge's specific findings in a related domestic violence 
case) ; WRIGHT & GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5106.4, 235 ( " m o s t 
courts agree that Rule 201 does not permit courts to judicially notice the truth of 
findings of fact"); Edward Kimball & Ronald Boyce, Utah Evidence Law 2-42 n.17 
(2d ed. 2004) ("While the existence of the finding would properly be a matter of 
notice, the accuracy of the finding would not be"). 
Here, defense counsel objected to the trial court judicially noticing Judge 
Quinn's wrongful-lien order, because it was a civil default judgment and " [went] to 
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the ultimate issue of fact in this case/7 R1166:22. Notably, defense counsel did not 
dispute that the wrongful-lien order was in fact entered, or that the judicial act of 
declaring the administrative judgment a wrongful lien in fact occurred. Id. In 
granting judicial notice, the trial court invoked the language of rule 201, observing 
that Judge Quinn's order "cannot be questioned/' it "was a judicial determination 
on a matter involving the administrative judgment," and "that determination of 
[Judge Quinn] conclusively binds the parties in making that determination that it 
was a wrongful lien." Id. at 34. 
While the trial court's oral ruling could have, arguably, been more artfully 
worded, the trial court nowhere stated that it was taking judicial notice of the truth 
or accuracy of Judge Quinn's wrongful-lien order. See id. at 34-35, 73-75,102-103. 
To the contrary, jurors were instructed only that the trial court was "taking judicial 
notice of the action of another court of this state." R116:102 (emphasis added). The 
jurors were then instructed that while the administrative judgment referenced in the 
consent judgment "was determined previously by a court of competent jurisdiction 
of this state to be a be a wrongful lien," and they could "consider the previous 
decision of that court finding" in their "deliberations in this case," they also had the 
discretion to "give that previous decision the weight that [they thought] it 
deserves." R1166:102-03. In other words, the jury was told that they could 
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disregard the prior finding if they chose to. The jurors were not instructed to notice 
the truth or accuracy of the wrongful-lien order. 
In support of his claims to the contrary, Defendant cites neither the language 
of the trial court's ruling granting judicial notice, nor to the judicial-notice 
instruction itself. Rather, Defendant cites to the prosecutor's argument —made 
outside the presence of jurors —in support of judicially noticing the wrongful-lien 
order. Aplt. Br. at 29-30 (citing R1166:25-27). Even assuming Defendant has 
correctly characterized the prosecutor's argument, the trial court did not incorporate 
the prosecutor's argument in deciding to judicially notice the wrongful-lien order. 
Rather, the trial court expressly instructed jurors to "give the previous decision the 
weight" they thought it deserved. R1166:102-03; see also id. at 34-35. 
Defendant nevertheless asserts that the trial court did more than take "judicial 
notice of the fact that a judgment was entered": "it also made reference to facts in 
this case and alleged that there may be a reason why the prior judgment would 
influence their deliberation about the 'Consent Judgment'" at issue. Aplt. Br. at 31. 
In other words, Defendant asserts that the trial court effectively instructed jurors to 
take judicial notice of the truth of the matter asserted. 
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the alleged "reference to the facts in this 
case" in the judicial-notice instruction is not reasonably construed as an instruction 
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that the wrongful-lien order was either true or accurate. Rather, the trial court 
merely provided necessary context, explaining how the consent judgment and 
administrative judgment were connected and clarifying that it was the 
administrative judgment that had previously been declared a wrongful-lien. See 
R1166:102-03. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the judicial-notice instruction did go to the 
truthfulness of the wrongful lien order, or to the ultimate fact confronting the jury, it 
still would not constitute an abuse of discretion. Utah law supports that trial courts 
may judicially notice "the ultimate facts that must be found in order for a claim or 
defense to succeed/7 Kimball & Boyce, Utah Evidence Law 2-38 (citing UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-21-2, a prior version of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-102 (West 2009)). 
Finally, while the trial court's judicial-notice instruction did not exactly parrot 
the language of rule 201(g), it was consistent with the rule and sufficiently conveyed 
to jurors that they did not have to accept the wrongful-lien order as any proof, let 
alone, conclusive proof that the administrative judgment was in fact a wrongful lien. 
As stated, jurors were instructed to give the wrongful-lien order only the weight 
they thought it deserved: 
. . . You may consider the previous decision of that court finding that 
the administrative judgment was a wrongful lien in your deliberations 
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in this case. And you may give that previous decision the weight that 
you think it deserves. 
R1166:103. This instruction did not therefore preclude defense counsel from 
arguing, as he did in closing, that jurors could, and should, completely disregard the 
wrongful-lien order. SeeR1282:283-84. 
In sum, the trial court properly took judicial notice of the wrongful-lien order 
because the order was a judicial action "capable of accurate and ready 
determination by resort to resources whose accuracy [could not] reasonably be 
questioned/' Utah R. Evid. 201(b)(2). Indeed, the judicially-noticed fact was not 
questioned here. R1166:34-35, 74. Contrary to Defendant's assertion, the judicial-
notice instruction did not notice the truth of the matter decided by the wrongful-lien 
order, or the ultimate fact confronting the jury, but even if it did, Utah law does not 
preclude judicially noticing the ultimate facts that must be found in order for a 
claim or defense to succeed. The judicial-notice instruction was further consistent 
with the language of rule 201(g) because it did not instruct that the wrongful-lien 
order was conclusive as to any fact or element. See R1166:102-03. While Defendant 
could have had jurors instructed "in the exact language" of the rule, defense counsel 
declined the trial court's invitation to do so. Id. at 34-35. As shown in part A, above, 
Defendant thus invited any error in the trial court's judicial-notice instruction. For 
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all of these reasons, Defendant fails to show any abuse of the trial court's discretion 
in judicially noticing the wrongful lien order. See Gallegos ex rel. Rynes v. Dick Simon 
Trucking, Inc., 2004 UT App 322, f 8,110 P.3d 710. 
C. Even if the trial court abused its discretion in judicially noticing 
the wrongful-lien order, Defendant fails to show any reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result absent the judicial notice. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court abused its discretion in 
judicially noticing the wrongful-lien order, Defendant suffered no unfair prejudice, 
because evidence that the consent judgment constituted a wrongful lien against 
Richard and Mary Pace, attorney Rivers, and Judge Davis was overwhelming. 
A lien is "any instrument or document that creates or purports to create a lien 
or encumbrance on an owner's interest in real or personal property or a claim on 
another's assets." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-503.5(l)(c) (West Supp. 2010-11). "A 
person is guilty of the crime of wrongful lien if that person knowingly makes, utters, 
records, or files a lien . . . having no objectively reasonable basis to believe that he 
has a present and lawful property interest in the property or a claim on the assets[.]" 
Section 76-6-503.5(2)(a); see also R958-964 (Instr. ##37-43) (copies of the elements 
instructions are attached in addendum D). 
Here, both the consent judgment and the incorporated administrative 
judgment were entered as exhibits for the jury to evaluate. See R1164 (manilla 
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exhibit envelope). While Defendant's son Jerry drafted the administrative 
judgment, it was undisputed that Defendant recorded both judgment documents in 
the county recorder's office. See State's Exh. ## 1-2. The consent judgment, which 
Defendant drafted, and which was the basis for the instant charges, states that the 
Paces, attorney Rivers, and Judge Davis, all agreed that they were jointly and 
severally liable for 4.2 million dollars, and that if the debt was not discharged within 
90 days, the consent judgment would "become a commercial lien.'" State's Exh. # 1 
at 4; see also id. at 3. The consent judgment incorporates the administrative 
judgment, which contains similar language. See State's Exh. #1 at 1-4; see also State's 
Exh. # 2 and Defendant's Exh. #1. 
It was undisputed that neither the Paces, attorney Rivers, nor Judge Davis 
had contractual obligations to Defendant, nor did they otherwise owe him money 
for which he would be entitled to record a lien. See R1166:130-31,151-52, 195-96; 
R1282:211. 
The only element Defendant disputed was that the consent judgment 
purported to be a lien. He opined that it was really a complaint and that he had not 
intended to record a lien. Rl282:186. But this testimony was undercut when 
Defendant acknowledged that the consent judgment "says if you don't do 
something, it can become a lien"; "they [the victims] chose never to respond"; and 
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that he had "yet" "to follow[ ] up on anything." Id. at 216. Defendant's testimony 
was further undercut by the language of the consent judgment itself, which states 
that the Paces, attorney Rivers, and Judge Davis, all agreed that they were jointly 
and severally liable for 4.2 million dollars, and that if the debt was not discharged 
within 90 days, the consent judgment would "become a 'commercial lien/" State's 
Exh. # 1 at 4; see also id. at 3. 
Defendant's expert acknowledged, among other things, that (1) lay people 
could find the administrative judgment and consent judgment in a number of ways 
and might also believe that the consent judgment was valid, R1282:105; see also id. at 
109,118-19,133; (2) the consent judgment could be read as purporting to put a lien 
on personal property, see id. at 120-21; see also id. at 170; and (4) her title company 
might reasonably deny insurance to an individual whose name came up on any 
similar document purporting to be a judgment for $4,000,000, see id. at 125,128-29. 
Given the above, the evidence abundantly supports that Defendant, at the 
very least, "knowingly" "ma[de], utterfed]," "fil[ed]" and/or "recordfed]... a lien," 
that "purported] to create a lien or encumbrance on an owner's interest in real or 
personal property or a claim on another's assets," and that Defendant had "no 
objectively reasonable basis to believe he ha[d] a present and lawful property 
interest in the property or a claim on the assets." Section 77-6-503.5(l)(c)-(2)(a). 
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Moreover, while the prosecutor reminded jurors that the administrative 
judgment had been declared a wrongful lien by another court, it was not the focus 
of his argument. See R1282:270. Rather, the prosecutor emphasized that (1) 
Defendant knowingly recorded the consent judgment in January 2007, having no 
objectively reasonable basis to believe that he was entitled to record a lien against 
the real or personal property of the victims, see id. at 271-75; see also id. at 268-69; (2) 
Defendant's credibility was questionable given his prior felony convictions and 
evidence that he was more than one year delinquent in paying taxes on the 
laundromat, see id. at 276-77; and that (3) Defendant's overall conduct in drafting 
and recording the consent judgment was unreasonable, see id. at 278-79. 
Finally, as shown, defense counsel vigorously argued that jurors should 
disregard the wrongful-lien order, because it was a default judgment obtained 
under a lesser standard of proof than that applied in criminal cases. See id. at 283-84. 
Indeed, on cross examination of Judge Davis, defense counsel elicited his agreement 
that the wrongful lien order resulted from a civil proceeding, which has a much 
lower standard of proof than a criminal proceeding.6 See R1166:l 68-69. 
6
 Defendant's claim that he was entitled to a mistrial based on Judge Davis's 
testimony is addressed in Point II of this brief. 
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In sum, jurors here would have convicted Defendant for filing a wrongful lien 
against Richard and Mary Pace, attorney Rivers, and Judge Davis, even if they had 
been unaware that another court had previously declared the administrative 
judgment a wrongful lien. The other evidence overwhelmingly established that in 
recording the consent judgment, Defendant knowingly filed wrongful liens against 
the real and personal property of the Paces, attorney Rivers, and Judge Davis, 
having no objectively reasonable basis for believing he was entitled to do so. 
Defendant has not shown, and cannot show on this record, that absent the alleged 
erroneous judicial notice, there was "a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
result/7 State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987) (emphasis and quotation 
marks omitted). 
1
 Jurors were also instructed on a narrower, alternative definition of wrongful 
lien. See R962 (Instr. # 41). UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1(6) (West 2004 & Supp. 2010-
11) defines a wrongful lien as "any document that purports to create a lien, notice of 
interest or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the 
time it is recorded is not: (a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or 
federal statute; (b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of 
competent jurisdiction in the state; or (c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a 
document signed by the owner of the real property/7 The prosecutor believed 
judicial notice of the wrongful-lien order was critical to prove this theory. See 
R1166:25-27. However, as shown, judicial notice was unnecessary to prove the 
State's primary theory under section 76-6-503.5, that when Defendant recorded the 
consent judgment, he purported to create a lien or encumbrance on the victims7 real 
or personal property, having no objectively reasonable basis to believe he was 
entitled to do so. 
31 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
REQUEST FOR A MISTRIAL BASED ON JUDGE DAVIS'S 
TESTIMONY. 
In Point II of his brief, Defendant asserts that "the trial court abused its 
discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial following Judge Davis's testimony 
on matters that the parties . . . agreed would be excluded and were beyond the type 
allowed by lay witnesses/' Aplt. Br. at 36. The trial court properly exercised its 
discretion to deny a mistrial because defense counsel elicited the "vast majority,/ of 
the challenged testimony on cross examination, see R1282:31-32, and because 
curative instructions were given, see R949-50 (Instr. ## 128-29). 
Proceedings below. Before trial, the parties stipulated that Judge Davis 
would "not make reference to his legal opinion because he's not been noticed as an 
expert on this matter." R1166:21. 
On direct examination, the prosecutor asked Judge Davis about the 
circumstances of the Paces quiet title action, and whether he believed that his 
involvement in that action was the reason why he had "a $4.2 million lien filed 
against [him]?" Id. at 152; see also R1284. Judge Davis responded that he had no 
idea why he had a "$4.2 million lien filed against. . . [his] home/' and that he did 
not have "the foggiest clue as a matter of law how that came about other than the 
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fact these so-called gibberish documents have been filed... and clouded the title on 
[his] home/7 Id. at 152. Judge Davis also affirmed that his familiarity with 
Defendant and his son Jerry stemmed primarily from the Pace quiet title action, 
although Jerry had also sued him in Washington state, but that suit was dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 153. Judge Davis further explained that he had filed "a 
petition to nullify these liens, both against [Jerry] and against [Defendant], and 
courts have ordered the nullification of the liens/7 Id. When the prosecutor asked if 
Judge Davis was referring to Judge Quinn's previously noticed wrongful-lien order, 
Judge Davis said "[tjhat's one of the two lawsuits . . . We proceeded also against 
[Defendant] and . . . that order was entered by an Honorable Dennis Fu[ch]s on the 
31st day of October 2007 and his ruling was the document entitled 'administrative 
judgment7 recorded on a given date — " Id. at 153-54. When defense counsel 
objected, the prosecutor stopped Judge Davis. Id. Defense counsel objected on the 
ground that "[w]hat Judge Fu[ch]s found" went "to the crucial issue and the 
ultimate fact issue in this case, which is a criminal case, not a civil proceeding." Id. 
On cross, Judge Davis affirmed that the recorded documents "cloud[ed] the 
title of [his] home," and that "a lien is, in essence, a document or something that 
says that a person owes someone money and they're attaching that debt to a 
property." Id. at 160. Judge Davis added that these documents "indicated that [the 
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lien] applied both to [his] real property and any personal property that [he] had/ ' 
Id. When defense counsel asked "where in those documents does it say it attaches 
to your real property/7 Judge Davis said he would look for the language, but that it 
"does as a matter of law." Id. Judge Davis could not readily locate the language he 
was looking for in the consent judgment, but explained that it was "in separate 
documents that were sent to [him] in connection with this." Id. at 162. 
Defense counsel next questioned Judge Davis about two specific paragraphs 
in the consent judgment. Judge Davis agreed that the consent judgment stated: 
(1) debtors agree that the statement and demand for payment is a 
true bill in commerce which by operation law provides 90 days 
to discharge the account receivable or the account becomes a 
commercial lien, and 
(2) debtors agree that after 90 days an unpaid debt due to the 
creditor may be assigned givfing] a new owner a right of lien to 
execute a lien hold claim against debtor's property holding claim 
until the first day of January [, 2105]. 
Id. at 164; see also State's Exh. # 1 at 4. When Judge Davis interpreted this language 
"as being a lien on [his] property until 2105," defense counsel interjected, "But it 
doesn't say it actually is a lien on your property, does i t . . . unless you actually don't 
pay the $4.2 million?" Id. at 164-65. Judge Davis agreed that, "[i]n that document 
itself[,] it doesn't say that." Id. at 165. He reiterated, however, that d was in a 
"separate document." Id. When Judge Davis indicated that he had located the 
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pertinent language in the consent judgment, defense counsel asked about it: "If 
you're talking about subparagraph Roman numeral nine, does it not say, [']debtors 
agree that the creditors right of lien is in the nature of a commercial lien.['] Is that 
what you were talking about[?]" Id. at 165-66. Judge Davis affirmed that this was 
the language and maintained that it created a lien on the title to his home. Id. at 166-
67. While Judge Davis agreed that his home address was nowhere listed in the 
consent judgment, he pointed out that the consent judgment could be located "by 
name . . . and [the consent judgment] lists [his] name as a debtor of $ 4.2 million/' 
Id. at 167. 
Defense counsel next asked whether Judge Davis had testified "that [the 
consent judgment] was a lien on [his] home as a matter of law," and the judge 
agreed. Id. He also affirmed defense counsel's statements that he had testified that a 
judgment "becomes a lien on your personal property," and that neither the consent 
judgment nor the administrative judgment were "authorized by a court of 
competent jurisdiction"; rather, they had both been "deemed" "to be invalid 
wrongful liens" in civil proceedings. Id. at 167-69. He further agreed that the 
standard of proof in a civil proceeding— a preponderance of the evidence — is much 
lower than the standard of proof in a criminal proceeding —beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Id. 
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Defense counsel next elicited that Ju dge Davis had not run a title search on his 
home before seeking to have either the consent judgment or the administrative 
judgment nullified. Id. at 170. When defense counsel asked Judge Davis if he was 
"presuming that that they actually clouded the title of [his] home . . . based on his 
legal experience/7 Judge Davis responded, "Oh, absolutely/' Id. When defense 
counsel sought to clarify that Judge Davis did not have "actual knowledge of that/7 
Judge Davis disagreed stating, 
I think I have actual knowledge of the fact that if you file a consent 
judgment that has $4.2 million in it[,] you're referred to as a debtor and 
you owe that $4.2 million to Richard-Donald: Cooper[,] that that clouds 
the title of your property. 
Id. Defense counsel asserted that this was Judge Davis's legal opinion, which he 
affirmed: "That's my legal opinion." Id. When defense counsel asked whether 
Judge Davis verified his legal opinion with the county recorder's office, Judge Davis 
responded that he had. Id. 
Finally, under defense counsel's questioning, Judge Davis reaffirmed that the 
consent judgment and administrative judgment had been nullified in civil 
proceedings, and that they had no legal basis. Id. at 174. He disagreed with defense 
counsel, however, that the process of obtaining the nullifications had been "easy." 
M a t 174-75. 
36 
On re-direct examination, Judge Davis affirmed that the administrative 
judgment was served on him in October 2004, the administrative judgment stated 
that if he and the other named debtors did not pay $4,200,000 within 90 days of 
service, there may be "a lien against all property/' and that he had never made any 
payment. Id. at 179; see also id. at 177-78. Judge Davis additionally affirmed that the 
consent judgment was recorded in January 2007, and that it listed Defendant as an 
assignee/creditor. See id. at 179-180. 
On re-cross, Judge Davis agreed that the administrative judgment stated that 
both Defendant and Jerry had "a right of lien to execute a lien hold claim in the 
amount of unpaid or unsatisified debt obligation of $4.2 million/' and that that 
neither Defendant nor Jerry had attempted to execute a lien or to sell the judge's 
home or personal property. Id. at 180-81. 
Before commencement of the second day of trial, defense counsel moved for a 
mistrial based on Judge Davis's testimony. R1282:13. Defense counsel asserted that 
Judge Davis misstated the law when he affirmed that a "judgment is a lien," and 
testified that was "how he knew [the documents] clouded his titles, because as a 
matter of law, these judgments clouded his titles." Id.; at 13-14; see also id. at 20. 
Defense counsel explained that he had not objected because he "didn't know that at 
the time because [he is] not a civil attorney." Id. at 21. However, he had since 
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"looked it up" and believed the judge's testimony was inconsistent with UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78B-5-201 (West 2004), which establishes when a judgment creates a lien. Id. 
at 14-15. Defense counsel posited that the statute required essentially three steps, 
including that the judgment be (1) from a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) filed in 
the "registry of judgment"; and (3) recorded. Id. at 15. Finally, defense counsel 
asserted that Judge Davis testified to inadmissible evidence when he "mentioned 
Judge Fuchs's ruling." Id. at 13-14. Defensecounsel asserted that the parties "never 
agreed to that and never discussed it." Id. at 14. 
The prosecutor objected to a mistrial on the ground that defense counsel 
elicited the challenged testimony on cross. See id. at 17. The prosecutor also pointed 
out that the State's theory was not that Defendant purported to file anything in 
district court that became a judgment/lien, but, rather, that Defendant purported to 
create a lien when he recorded the consent judgment. Id. at 19. Accordingly, the 
judge's affirmation that a judgment becomes a lien, whether or not mistaken, was 
unlikely to unfairly prejudice the jury. Id. at 19-20. 
Defense counsel disagreed that he had invited the judge's testimony and 
asserted that Judge Davis "volunteered all this information and he talked about 
them being liens, clouding his title as a matter of law during direct and cross 
examination." Id. at 20. Defense counsel acknowledged that he "could have done 
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many things/7 but stated he was constrained because he was "cross examining a 
judge, something that has never happened before and most likely will never happen 
again and it's a completely different situation and that's what makes this unique/ ' 
Id. Defense counsel asserted that he did not anticipate the judge would "testify that 
way, I wasn't anticipating that he would have talked about Fuchs and Judge Quinn 
so many times." Id. at 21. 
The prosecutor offered to stipulate to an instruction that Judge Davis's 
testimony should be "given the same consideration as you give that of any other 
witness. The fact that he is a District Court Judge does not make him any different 
than any other witness." R1282:23. The prosecutor additionally suggested that the 
court reiterate its instruction that only the trial court instructs on matters of law. Id. 
at 24. 
The trial court also suggested that an instruction or stipulation could remedy 
any error: "[P]erhaps we can simply . . . clarify[ ] . . . that the parties agree that 
Judge Davis misspoke and that the —that what he was referring to was the 
administrative judgment, Exhibit # 2, not Exhibit # 1," or "that Judge Davis 
misspoke and the document that was declared to be a wrongful lien by the other 
judges in a civil action appears to be the administrative judgment, not the consent 
judgment." Id. at 28, 30. 
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Defense counsel would not agree to any of the suggested remedies. See id. at 
30. Defense counsel asserted that Judge Davis "misstated the law and we believe 
the jury will give that undue influence that will prejudice [Defendant]/' Id. at 31. 
However, if the trial court was inclined to deny a mistrial, defense counsel 
requested an instruction that the judge misspoke regarding the consent judgment, 
and that he misstated the law regarding a judgment becoming a lien. Id.; see also id. 
34-35. 
Thereafter, the trial court denied a mistrial, disagreeing with defense counsel 
that Judge Davis misstated the law with regard to a judgment becoming a lien, id. at 
31-32, and agreeing with the prosecutor that the defense counsel elicited the 
challenged testimony on cross examination; thus, any error was invited: "[T]he vast 
majority of what came out during Judge Davis' testimony regarding the action of 
Judge Fuchs and Judge Quinn, was really brought out by [defense counsel]. I —I 
don't recall that it came out on [the prosecutor's] direct examination." Id. at 32; see 
also id. at 31. 
Because the trial court denied a mistrial, it agreed to instruct jurors that Judge 
Davis had misspoken. Id. at 31. The prosecutor objected to the instruction unless 
defense counsel agreed to stipulate that the judge misspoke. Id. at 32-33. Defense 
counsel refused to stipulate, because "[t]hat would be waiving any kind of 
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impeachment argument/7 Id. at 33. Rather, defense counsel proposed that the trial 
court instruct jurors that Judge Davis made an incorrect statement of law regarding 
how a judgment becomes a lien: 
You have heard testimony from Judge Lynn Davis that an entry of a 
judgment by a district court in the State of Utah creates a lien upon real 
property of the judgment debtor, as a matter of law; however, that 
testimony was incorrect. In the State of Utah, a Utah state district court 
judgment does not automatically create a lien against a judgment 
debtor. Additional requirements must be met before a judgment from 
a Utah state district court will become a lien. 
Id. at 34. 
The trial court questioned why it should instruct jurors "[h]ow a district court 
judgment becomes a lien/7 observing that it was "really irrelevant to whether or not 
this was a —an unlawful lien or purports to be an unlawful lien/' Id. at 35. The 
prosecutor requested that the trial court instruct jurors on how a judgment becomes 
a lien under section 78B-5-201. Id. at 35-38. Defense counsel objected to the 
prosecutor's request, arguing that the prosecutor was "changing [his] theory to say 
that it purports to be a judgment, therefore, it purports to be a lien." Id. at 39. 
Based on the above, the trial court ruled that it would not give Defendant's 
requested instruction, but that it would instruct jurors that Judge Davis "is testifying 
as a person and not an expert." Id. at 40; sec also R949 (Instr. # 28) (a copy of the 
instruction is attached in addendum E). The trial court further ruled that if defense 
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counsel so desired, he would also instruct on how a judgment becomes a lien. Id. at 
41. The trial court commented that defense counsel could then argue, "that the 
witness was in fact, mistaken, the way you view the — the testimony/7 Id. at 41. The 
trial court reiterated, however, that he did not believe that Judge Davis had, in fact, 
misstated the law. Id. 
Defense counsel objected to any instruction on how a judgment becomes a 
lien, because he thought it would be too confusing for the jury. Id. at 41. When the 
prosecutor reiterated that he wanted the instruction, the trial court agreed to 
consider it, but reserved a "final ruling on it until [he] [saw] the actual instruction/' 
Id. at 43. 
Thereafter, the State rested, and defense counsel recalled Judge Davis. Id. at 
44, 47-48. When defense counsel asked Judge Davis if he had previously testified 
"that Judge Fuchs had ruled that the consent judgment was a wrongful lien/' the 
prosecutor objected. Id. at 48-49. Outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor 
argued that this question served only to compound the alleged error at the heart of 
the mistrial motion. Id. at 49-50. Defense counsel argued that because a mistrial was 
denied, he was attempting to "rectify [the problems in the case] as best as [he] 
[could]/' Id. at 50; see also id. at 57. Defense counsel indicated that if the trial court 
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would not allow him to "explore this with this witness/' he would ask for an 
instruction on what it takes for a judgment to become a lien. Id. at 64-65. 
The trial court ruled that defense counsel could ask Judge Davis about Judge 
Fuchs's ruling and the requirements for a judgment to become a lien, but that he 
would not allow defense counsel to "get into an argument with [the judge] as to 
your interpretation of the law or his interpretation of the law." Id. at 66. After 
jurors returned, defense counsel again asked whether Judge Davis had previously 
testified that "Judge Fuchs had found that the consent judgment was a wrongful 
lien in a civil proceeding." Id. at 67. Judge Davis responded that if he had 
previously testified "that the consent judgment had been found to be a wrongful 
lien by Judge Fuchs," he had misspoken, and that Judge Fuchs' order did not make 
reference to the consent judgment. Id. at 68-69. Judge Davis further affirmed that 
section 78B-5-201 set forth the requirements for a judgment to become a lien, 
including that the judgment must be filed in the registry of judgments of the district 
court, and must also be recorded. Id. at 69-70. 
Thereafter, outside the presence of the jury, the parties agreed on, among 
other instructions, an instruction on how a judgment becomes a lien. See id. at 145-
152; see also R950 (Instr. # 29) (a copy of the instruction is attached in addendum E). 
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In closing argument, defense counsel argued that Judge Davis was mistaken 
as to whether the consent judgment had been declared a wrongful lien, and as to 
how a judgment becomes a lien. See R1282:280-81. 
A. The trial court properly exercised its discretion to deny a mistrial 
where Defendant invited the vast majority of challenged 
testimony and curative instructions were given. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a 
mistrial because Judge Davis's testimony violated the parties' stipulation that he 
would not give his legal opinion. Aplt. Br. at 36. Although defense counsel elicited 
Judge Davis's opinion on cross that the consent and administrative judgments 
attached to his property and clouded his title as a matter of law, see, e.g., R1166:160, 
167, 170, Defendant asserts that "the statements made during cross were only 
elicited in order to try to confront the incorrect and prejudicial statements already 
made on direct." Aplt. Br. at 44. Contrary to Defendant's assertion, the prosecutor's 
direct examination of Judge Davis did not open the door to defense counsel's 
extensive cross examination about the |udge's legal opinion; thus, the trial court 
properly denied a mistrial on the ground that any error was invited by Defendant. 
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Moreover, the trial court also properly denied a mistrial where it gave curative 
instructions, including that Judge Davis was not testifying as an expert. 
As shown, the prosecutor did not ask Judge Davis to offer his opinion as a 
judge or legal expert. See R1166:152. Rather, the prosecutor asked for background 
information about the judge's involvement in the Paces' quiet title action. Id. Judge 
Davis affirmed that his default judgment in the Pace case likely caused Defendant 
and his son to record the consent and administrative judgments that clouded his 
title. Id. at 152-53. The judge's testimony in this regard was not expert legal 
opinion, but constituted no more than fair factual background that may fairly be 
offered by any crime victim. Although the judge used the statutory term "lien" in 
describing the recorded documents, his use of the term was mere short hand and 
did not render this factual information a formal legal opinion. Id. Judge Davis 
further testified that he did not "have the foggiest clue as a matter of law how [the 
liens] came about other than the fact these so-called gibberish documents have been 
filed." Id. But this testimony cannot be fairly characterized as an expression of 
Judge Davis's expert legal opinion that either the consent or administrative 
As noted, the trial court denied a mistrial on the additional ground that it 
did not believe that Judge Davis misstated the law with regard to how a judgment 
becomes a lien. See 1282:31-32. Defendant does not challenge this basis for the trial 
court's ruling on appeal. See Aplt. Br. at 42. 
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judgments in fact attached to his property, as Defendant asserts. See Aplt. Br. at 45 
('This unresponsive statement made the conclusion that the filing of the document 
attached a lien to his home"). At most, Judge Davis expressed his frustration as a 
victim that the "liens" or "gibberish documents" had caused him so much trouble, 
and that he did not understand how they could have had any legal effect. 
Rather than object to any of the above statements, defense counsel delved 
deeper on cross, inquiring extensively about Judge Davis's legal opinion and its 
bases. Defense counsel thus compounded any possible error committed on direct 
examination. See, e.g., R1166: 160,167,170. As found by the trial court, the "vast 
majority" of the challenged evidence was in fact adduced on cross; therefore, any 
error was invited and did not warrant a mistrial. See R1282:32; see also State v. 
Dominguez, 2003 UT App 158, ^ 38-40, 72 P.3d 127 (upholding denial of mistrial 
"where Defendant invited the error by eliciting the testimony in front of the jury"). 
Defendant further asserts that Judge Davis wandered outside the parameters 
of the parties' stipulation on direct when he testified that the judicially-noticed order 
declaring the administrative judgment a wrongful lien was only "one of the two 
lawsuits," and that Judge Fuchs had also entered a ruling on the administrative 
judgment. Aplt. Br. at 46 (citing R1166:153-54). But as Defendant acknowledges, 
Judge Davis stopped short of testifying that Judge Fuchs had declared either the 
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consent judgment or the administrative judgment a wrongful lien. Id. Moreover, 
defense counsel recalled Judge Davis as a defense witness and elicited his 
clarification that if he had previously testified that Judge Fuchs declared the consent 
judgment a wrongful lien, he misspoke, because Judge Fuchs's ruling referenced 
only the administrative judgment. See R1282:68-69. This testimony cured any 
possible suggestion in Judge Davis's earlier testimony that both the consent and the 
administrative judgments had been nullified or declared wrongful liens. 
Additionally, jurors were instructed to treat Judge Davis's testimony the same 
as any other witness and that he was not testifying as a legal expert. See R949 (Instr. 
# 28); see also R939 (Instr. # 8) and R941 (Instr. # 12). They were also instructed on 
how a judgment becomes a lien. See R950 (Instr. # 29). Jurors are presumed to 
follow the instructions given and to act according to law. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 
393, 401 (Utah 1994); see also State v. Devey, 2006 UT App 219, f 16, 138 P.3d 90. 
Thus, even assuming Judge Davis's testimony on direct or cross was "questionably 
admitted" it was not unfairly prejudicial, because curative instructions were given. 
State v. Rugebregt, 965 P.2d 518, 524-25 (Utah App. 1998) (internal citation omitted). 
The trial court's curative instructions here - that Judge Davis was not testifying as a 
legal expert and that a judgment does not become a lien unless it is both filed in the 
registry of judgments of the district court and recorded at the county recorders 
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office —"'adequately treated the subject and thus neutralized whatever error may 
have occurred at trial by giving the jury a framework within which to weigh the 
[judge's] testimony.'" Id. at 525 (quoting Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 R2d 730, 733 (Utah 
1982)). Defendant thus fails to show any abuse of the trial court's discretion in 
denying a mistrial. Dominguez, 2003 UT App 158, ^ 39. 
B. Even if the trial court abused its discretion in denying a mistrial, 
Defendant fails to show a reasonable likelihood of a different 
outcome absent Judge Davis's testimony. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
a mistrial, Defendant has not shown a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome 
absent Judge Davis's challenged testimony. As shown in Point 1(C), the jury's guilty 
verdicts here are supported by overwhelming evidence. Indeed, the consent and 
administrative judgment documents that Defendant recorded speak for themselves. 
And there was a dearth of evidence that Defendant reasonably believed he was 
entitled to record the judgments. See State's Exh. ##1-2; see also Point 1(C). 
Additionally, as shown, Judge Davis clarified, on being recalled as a defense 
witness, that only the administrative judgment was declared a wrongful lien. See 
R1282:68-69. Jurors were also given curative instructions that Judge Davis was not 
testifying as a legal expert, and that a judgment does not become a lien until it is 
both filed in the judgment registry and recorded. Sec R949-50 (Instr. ## 28-29). And 
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while defense counsel emphasized in closing that Judge Davis made mistakes in his 
testimony on direct and cross, see R1282:280-81, the prosecutor did not reference the 
judge's testimony at all. See Point 1(D). 
Finally, Judge Davis's opinion that the consent and administrative judgments 
clouded the title to his home was merely cumulative of Defendant's own expert, 
who acknowledged, among other things, that a lay person could find the consent 
judgment and believe that it was valid, see R1282:105,119, that the consent judgment 
may purport to put a lien on personal property, see id. at 120-21; see also id. at 170, 
and that her title company might deny insurance to a lender whose name came up 
on a similar document purporting to be a judgment for 4 million dollars, see id. at 
125,128-29. 
Given the above, particularly the consent and administrative judgments 
themselves, jurors would have convicted Defendant for filing a wrongful lien 
against the Paces, attorney Rivers, and Judge Davis, even if they had not heard 
Judge Davis's testimony. Defendant has not shown, and cannot show on this 
record, that absent the judge's challenged testimony, there was "a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result." Knight, 734 P.2d at 919 (emphasis and 
quotation marks omitted). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
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Addendum A 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-503.5 Page 1 
West's Utah Code Annotated Cunentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
*$ Chapter 6. Offenses Against Property 
Kig Part 5. Fraud 
-t § 76-6-503.5. Wrongful liens and fraudulent handling of recordable writings-Penalties 
(1) "Lien" means: 
(a) an instrument or document filed pursuant to Section 70A-9a-516; 
(b) an instrument or document described in Subsection 38-9-1(6); and 
(c) any instrument or document that creates or purports to create a lien or encumbrance on an owner's interest 
in real or personal property or a claim on another's assets. 
(2) A person is guilty of the crime of wrongful lien if that person knowingly makes, utters, records, or files a li- en: 
(a) having no objectively reasonable basis to believe he has a present and lawful property interest in the prop-
erty or a claim on the assets; or 
(b) if the person files the lien in violation of a civil wrongful lien injunction pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 9a, 
Wrongful Lien Injunctions. 
(3) A violation of this section is a third degree felony unless the person has been previously convicted of an of-
fense under this section, in which case the violation is a second degree felony. 
(4)(a) Any person who with intent to deceive or injure anyone falsifies, destroys, removes, records, or conceals 
any will, deed, mortgage, security instrument, lien, or other writing for which the law provides public recording 
is guilty of fraudulent handling of recordable writings. 
(b) A violation of Subsection (4)(a) is a third degree felony unless the person has been previously convicted of 
an offense under this section, in which case the violation is a second degree felony. 
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(5) This section does not prohibit prosecution for any act in violation of Section 76-8-414 or for any offense 
greater than an offense under this section. 
CREDIT(S) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Prior Laws: 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-503. 
Laws 1997, c. 125, § 6. 
C. 1953, §§ 38-9-5, 76-6-503. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Wrongful lien for purposes of wrongful lien injunction referring to lien made in violation of this section, 
see§ 38-9a-102. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-503.5, UT ST § 76-6-503.5 
Current through 2010 General Session 
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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U C A 1953 §38-9-1 Page 1 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated CunentnebS 
Title 38 Liens 
M Chaptei c) Wrongful Liens and Wrongful Judgment Liens (Reft & Annos) 
-• § 38-9-1. Definitions 
As used m this chapter 
(1) "Interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, lawful property interest in certain real 
pioperty, including an owner, title holder, mortgagee, trustee, or beneficial owner 
(2) "Lien claimant" means a person claiming an interest m leal property who offers a document for recording or 
filing with any county recorder in the state asserting a lien, or notice of mteiest, oi othei claim of mteiest m cei-
tain real property 
(3) "Owner" means a person who has a vested ownership interest m certain real property 
(4)(a) "Record interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, lawful property interest in cer-
tain real property, including an owner, titleholder, mortgagee, trustee, or beneficial owner, and whose name and 
interest m that real property appears m the county recorder's records for the county in which the property is loc-
ated 
(b) "Record interest holder" includes any grantor in the chain of the title in certain real property 
(5) "Record owner" means an owner whose name and ownership interest m certain real property is recorded or 
filed in the county recoider's records for the county m which the property is located 
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a hen, notice of mteiest, or encumbrance on an 
ownei's interest m certain real property and at the time it is recorded is not 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state oi federal statute, 
(b) authorized by oi contained m an order or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction m the state, or 
(c) signed by or authonzed pursuant to a document signed by the ownei of the real propeity 
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CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1997, c 12* ^2 eft Kh\ \ 1997,1 aus 2008, c 22 3, ^ 1 eif Ma> 5, 2008,1 aw s 2009 c 69,* 1 eif 
Ma\ 12 2009, laws 2010 c 381, ^ 20 eif Maj 11,2010 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Former § 38-9-1, derived from Laws 1985, c 182, I elated to liability of person filing wrongful lien 
Laws 2008, c 223, § 1, m subsec (6), inserted ", notice of interest," 
Laws 2009, c 69, § 1, designated former subsec (4) as subsec (4)(a) and added subsec (4)(b) 
Laws 2010, c 381, § 20, m subsec (6), deleted "or filed" following "recorded" 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Lien defined as instrument or document desenbed m this section, wrongful liens and fraudulent handling 
of recordable wntmgs, see $ 76-6-503 5 
Recording of judgment in registry of judgments, see § 78B-5-201 
Wrongful lien defined as instrument or document under this section for purposes of wrongful lien injunc-
tions, see § 3 8-9a-102 
RESEARCH REFERENCES 
ALR Libiary 
61 A L R 4th 464, What Constitutes Negligence Sufficient to Render Attorney Liable to Person Other Than Im-
mediate Client 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
Liabilities to third persons 2 
Review 3 
Wrongful hen I 
1 Wrongful hen 
Subcontiactoi's unenfoiceable mechanic's hen on homeowneis' home was not a "wrongful hen" foi purposes of 
Wiongful Lien Injunction Act (WLIA), as WLIA borrowed its definition of "wrongful hen" fiom Wrongful Lien 
Act (WLA), the WLA defined "wrongful hen" as any document that purported to create a hen on an owner's in-
terest m real property and at time it was lecorded oi filed was not expressly authoiized by statute, and the phrase 
"not expiessly authorized by statute" did not include statutorily cieated hens that ultimately prove unenfoice-
able 11uttci \ Dig-It lvc 2009 219 P 3d 918, 642 1 tali \d\ Rep 3,2009 1'! 69 Mechanics'I iens €==> 160 
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Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 201 Pa 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
KS Utah Rules of Evidence (Refs & Annos) 
KiM Article II. Judicial Notice 
-* RULE 201. JUDICIAL NOTICE OF ADJUDICATIVE FACTS 
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) 
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determ-
ination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not. 
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary 
information. 
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the pro-
priety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the re-
quest may be made after judicial notice has been taken. 
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding. 
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any 
fact judicially noticed. In a criminal case, the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, ac-
cept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and consolidates the law of judicial notice formerly contained in Rules 9 
through 12, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) and m I "tah Code Annotated, $ 78-25-1 (1953) [superseded by this 
mle] into one broadly defined rule. The Utah Supreme Court has stated the rule with reference to judicial notice 
m Little Cottonwood Water ( a. v Kimball, 76 I tah 243, 267. 289 Pac. 116 (1930) where the court stated: "In 
short, a court is presumed to know what every man of ordinary intelligence must know about such things." See 
also Diffusion Co v Utah Liquor Control Convn'n 613 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1980). 
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Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 201 Pa 
Subdivision (a) "governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts," and does not deal with instances in which a 
court may notice legislative facts, which is left to the sound discretion of trial and appellate courts. Compare 
Rule 12, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). Since legislative facts are matters that go to the policy of a rule of law 
as distinct from the true facts that are used in the adjudication of a controversy they are not appropriate for a rule 
of evidence and best left to the law-making considerations by appellate and trial courts. 
Subdivision (b) is in accord with the Little Cottonwood Water Co. case, supra, and the substance of Rule 9(1) 
and (2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). Utah law presumes that the law of another jurisdiction is the same as 
that of the State of Utah and judicial notice has been taken from the law of other states and foreign countries. 
lamhcrth v. Lamhcrth, 550 P.2d 200 (Utah 1976); Maple v. Maple, 566 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1977). The Utah court 
has taken judicial notice under Rule 9(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) of the rules and regulations of the Tax 
Commission. Nelson v. State Tax Cnmm'n, 29 Utah 2d 162, 506 P.2d 437 (1973). The broad language of subdi-
vision (b) is identical to Rule 201 of the Iniform Rules of Evidence (1974). Judicial notice of foreign law is per-
missible under this rule. Provisions of this rule supersede Utah Code Annotated. Section 78-25-1 (1953), since 
the statute is merely illustrative of items encompassed within the broad framework of this rule. The foreign law 
of some jurisdictions might best be left to proof through witnesses if the resort to sources available in the State 
of Utah is questionable. 
Subdivision (c) is discretionary, but subdivision (d) requires the court to take judicial notice if requested by a 
party and if supplied with the necessary information to make a determination of whether to take judicial notice. 
Compare Rules 9(2) and 10(3), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). The committee believes that Rule 201(d) simpli-
fies the process of taking judicial notice of adjudicative facts by making it mandatory when a party makes a re-
quest therefor and supplies the court with the necessary information. 
Subdivision (e) is similar to Rule 10(1), (2) and (3), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Subdivision (g) is in accord with Rule 11, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). The provision that in a criminal case 
the court shall instruct the jury that it may but is not required to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed 
has no counterpart in Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). Accord, State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323. 234 P.2d 600 
(1951). See also Amendment VI, Constitution of the United States. 
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Addendum B 
WHEN RECORDED RETURN TO: 
Richard-Donald: Cooper, Record Owner 
Post Office Box 667 
Little field, Arizona [near 86432] 
Richard-Donald: Cooper 
% Post Office Box 667 
Littlefield, Arizona [near 86432] 
Tracking Claim No. AJ-2 7-21-98 
ASSIGNEE CREDITOR 
versus 
Richard W. Pace 
1350 East 300 North 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Mary J. Pace 
1350 East 300 North 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Rodney W. Rivers 
497 North 800 East 
Lindon, Utah 84042 
Lynn W. Davis 
%125 North 100 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
DEBTORS 
CONSENT JUDGMENT 
State of Arizona ) NOTICE TO AGENT IS NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL 
) ss NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL IS NOTICE TO ALL AGENTS 
County of Mohave ) EQUALITY UNDER THE LAW IS PARAMOUNT AND MANDATORY UNDER LAW. 
COMES NOW Richard-Donald: Cooper, I, me, my, lawful man, assignee Creditor, 
hereinafter "Creditor", record owner, with right in ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGMENT, Claim 
AJ-2 7-21-98, dated 12 November, 2004, and all associated accounts, and I am one of the 
People of the United States of America, and this court of record complained of trespass on 
the case, is in the nature of an independent private * international natural law administrative 
adjudicatory action, I, by way of assignment, having entered into an equitable agreement by 
consent of the parties under Tacit Procuration, wherein Debtors saw Creditor managing 
Debtors' affairs and did not interfere to prevent it, Creditor does now proceed to judgment for 
the purpose of executing a settlement of the adjudicatory process on the adjudicative facts, 
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which relate to the parties, as presented in the verified Exclusive administrative record, as 
settled, admitted and undisputed issues of fact, with no controversy between the parties, 
pursuant to the maxim of law, PROCURATIONEM ADVERSUS NULLA EST PRAESCRIPTIO 
[There is no prescription against procuration], this *court, the person and suite of the 
sovereign, performing an adjudicative function, finds judgment upon agreement of the parties, 
by their acts entered upon the record, rather then by the court, with the sanctions and approval 
of the court upon rules, rather then by the court, as follows: 
1. That this court has necessary initial and continuing general jurisdiction to enter a 
Consent Judgment and issue Orders regarding the exercise of said jurisdiction with sanctions. 
2. That Creditor party is Richard-Donald: Cooper who is owner of the private verified 
exclusive administrative records, Claim AJ-2 7-21-98, dated 12 November, 2004, and 
associated account, Claim AJ-1 7-21-98, dated 14 September, 1998, and is the authorized 
representative, not surety, for RICHARD D. COOPER, ens legis, and is the lawful man who 
is the injured 3rd party Creditor for recovery of damages resulting from Debtor's acts. 
3. That the Debtor parties are: 
Richard W. Pace, 1350 East 300 North, American Fork, Utah 84003 
Mary J. Pace, 1350 East 300 North, American Fork, Utah 84003 
Rodney W. Rivers, 497 North 800 East, Lindon, Utah 84042 
Lynn W. Davis, %125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
4. The Creditor and Debtor parties have entered into an equitable agreement by consent of 
the parties under Tacit Procuration, the act by which the Debtors gave Creditor proxy power of 
attorney to act for Debtors, wherein the verified administrative record shows as admitted, 
undisputed, and settled, all issues of fact as contained in the verified record entitled, 
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGMENT, Claim AJ-2 7-21-98, of 35 pages, dated 12 November, 2004, 
as recorded for perpetual memory and testimony, under No. 128768:2004, Utah County Recorder, 
"J["exclusive" indicates a "primary jurisdiction*' capacity to "finally decide issues" by an initial 
decision, order, or administrative judgment, which "determination is to secure the administrative judgment 
either in the one case, - in substitution for judicial - or, in the other, as foundation for or perchance to 
make unnecessary later judicial proceedings." A.& D. Eq Corp v Hirsch, 331 US 752, 767, 67 SCt 1493, 
1500-1501,91 LEd2d 350 (1963). As to primary jurisdiction doctrine, the court said - "Court jurisdiction 
is not thereby ousted, but only postponed." U.S. v Phil. Nat. Bank, 374 US 321, 83 S.Ct. 1715, 1737, 10 
LEd2d 915 (1963). (but is usually limited to review only arbitrary, capricious or abuse of discretion.)] 
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15 Nov, 2004, cited public Exhibit MA\ incorporated by reference herein, be ratified, confirmed, 
and incorporated in this Consent Judgment as fully set forth. [The complete private verified 
administrative record, Tracking No. AJ-2 7-21-98, an associated accounts, is deposited with the 
Creditor and copies are available at Creditor's location for a reasonable fee upon request.] 
5. That the facts contained in the verified exclusive administrative record are true. 
Therefore, IT IS ORDERED, ASCERTAINED AND DECREED 
A. That the referenced public Exhibit WAW, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGMENT, Claim 
AJ-2 7-21-98, dated 12 November, 2004, of 35 pages, by Affidavit, is hereby ratified, 
confirmed, and by reference incorporated into this Decree as though fully set forth. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ASCERTAINED AND DECREED 
B. That Creditor has exhausted his administrative remedies and it has been determined from 
the administrative record that the correct process has been completed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ASCERTAINED AND DECREED 
C. That the administrative record shows that Richard W. Pace, dba, RICHARD W. 
PACE, is a Debtor, personally, having admitted to each fact as the official declaration of 
Debtor, and last known mailing address is 1350 East 300 North, American Fork, Utah 84003. 
D. That the administrative record shows that Mary J. Pace, dba, MARY J. PACE, is a 
Debtor, personally, having admitted to each fact as the official declaration of Debtor, and last 
known mailing address is 1350 East 300 North, American Fork, Utah 84003. 
E. That the administrative record shows that Rodney W. Rivers, dba, RODNEY W. 
RIVERS, is a Debtor, personally, having admitted to each fact as the official declaration of 
Debtor, and/or of the Debtor's office, and/or capacity of the officer, official, or agent, and last 
known mailing address is 497 North 800 East, Lindon, Utah 84042, 
F. That the administrative record shows that Lynn W. Davis, dba, LYNN W. DAVIS, is a 
Debtor, personally, having admitted to each fact as the official declaration of Debtor, and/or 
of the Debtor's office, and/or capacity of the officer, official, or agent, and last known mailing 
address is %125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ASCERTAINED AND DECREED 
G. That Richard W. Pace dba RICHARD W. PACE, Mary J. Pace dba MARY J. PACE, 
Rodney W. Rivers dba RODNEY W RIVERS, & Lynn L. Davis dba LYNN W. DAVIS, shall 
severally & jointly perform to the equitable agreement by Tacit Procuration as Debtors to wit: 
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(I) Debtors agree to the payment or satisfaction of all liability, debt or obligations 
incurred under Administrative Judgment, Claim No. AJ-2 7-21-98, and other 
charges or fees which may be incurred in any collection actions, 
(II) Debtors agree to being public persons, each having acted in some capacity as 
agents having done acts deemed prejudicial to Creditor's secured Constitutional 
rights, privileges or liberty, 
(HI) Debtors agree that 42 counts of Creditor's secured Constitutional rights, 
privileges or liberty, were impaired or deprived under color of Utah law, by 
conspiracy did cause injury to Creditor, 
(IV) Debtors agree that **$100,000.00 dollars for each of 42 counts of said injury is 
an equitable amount as just compensation, 
(V) Debtors agree that $4,200,000.00 constitutes the total amount due and owing, 
by Debtors, severally and jointly, with no interest thereon, 
(VI) Debtors agree that the instrument identified as DEFAULT, DISHONOR and 
DECISION constitutes a Statement and Demand for payment, 
(VII) Debtors agree that the Statement and Demand for payment is a "true bill in 
commerce" which by operation of law provides 90 days to discharge the 
"account receivable" or the account become a "commercial lien", 
(Vm) Debtors agree that after 90 days an unpaid debt due to the Creditor, may be 
assigned giving a new owner a Right of Lien to execute a Lien Hold Claim 
against Debtors' property, holding claim until the 1st day of January, 2105, 
(IX) Debtors agree that Creditor's Right of Lien is in the nature of a commercial lien 
and is not a lis pendens lien, and is not a statutory lien, and is not a common 
law lien, and does not require a court process for its establishment, validity, or 
execution, and it cannot be removed by summary process (judge's discretion), 
nor by anyone except the authorized Lien Holder, 
(X) Debtors agree that the NOTICE AND DEMAND (for establishment of Claims 
and Obligation) by Affidavit constitutes a TRUE BILL IN COMMERCE as 
established by verified ledgering with every entry, by number, sworn true, 
correct and complete, and not misleading, in good faith, not in bad faith, and 
(XI) Debtors agree that the authorized Lien Holder, may open any administrative 
procedure for further remedy or relief until the attainment of the ends of justice 
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have been satisfied anytime prior to the 1st day of January, AD 2105. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ASCERTAINED AND DECREED 
H. That as an operation of Law, the administrative admitted facts in this Consent 
Judgment are not subject to reconsideration in any action in Law, Commerce, or otherwise, 
and this Consent Judgment shall be recorded for a perpetual memory and testimony. 
I. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the terms of the Hague Convention of October 
25, 1980, and January 13, 2000, adopted by the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law, apply if a party abducts or wrongfully retains a party in a forcing country. 
CONSENT JUDGMENT IS SO ENTERED. 
This declaration is executed mj)psp*i->0HKn rJMco*e\ on the 2f. day of January, 2007. 
&JL#*u~M, 4 W L.S. 
Judgment By Agreement of the^Parties 
COMMERCIAL OATH AND VERIFICATION 
I, Richard-Donald: Cooper, certify under my unlimited liability Commercial Oath and having 
first hand knowledge of the facts with competence that the foregoing statements and facts are 
true, correct, complete and certain, and the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth. 
By Richard-Donald: Cooper/ 
NOTICE: Use of a notary public on this document is to attest and certify and to give it credit and 
authenticity in a foreign jurisdiction by a public officer for entry into the public venue. 
I, a notary public residing in ft00H-AO£- county, Qf?-l<£jO /0 A state, do certify 
that a man known to me, or proven satisfactorily, as Richard-Donald: Cooper did appear before me in 
his true character and did swear to the truthfulness of the afrpyf f^"™™^ nH •!"! ^liiiunrily affix his 
signature on the same, on this the ^ M - ^ day tof thqgrath ofcaftftQl^&<85lL 2007. 
NOTARY PUBLIC - ARIZONA 
< C D ~*~ n 1 i v t t ¥£^g } MOHAVE COUNTY 
^ J ^ \ K A. t r> ^55 t\n I J kJ&Z^tf My Commission Expires 
NOTARY PUBLIC I — ^ o l ^ 
[** Parties herein do take silent judicial notice that government officials are to protect all people of 
the United States of America in their peaceful exercise of secured constitutional rights [cf, Title 18 
USC 241-242], which exercise cannot be converted into a crime [cf Miller v. US], and people may 
engage in the regulated liberty with impunity [cf. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham], and upon an 
act to "deprive" the exercise of right under color of law is an illegal act [cf. 42 USC 1983], wherein 
the claim in a "rights" action must "exceed the sum of $50,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs" [cf. 
Title 28 USC 1331(a)], with the right of privacy protected under the 4th amendment [cf. U.S.& State 
Constitutions], even an invasion of "privacy" is a cause of action constituting a constitutional tort for 
the recovery of damages [cf. Bivens v. 6 Agents], wherein government officers have no immunity [cf 
Owens v. City of Independence], and after claim of rights to desist from taking, imposes liability on 
judges for personal damages [cf. PuIIiam v. Alien]. 
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Addendum C 
IN THE OFFICE OF RECORDER 
Recording Requested by: 
Jerry C. Cooper, Record CXmer 
Jer ry C. Cooper UTAH COUNTY RECORDER 
245 Astro Drive E004 Nov 15 3:48 pi FEE 78.00 BY LJ 
Kelso, Washington [98626] RECORDED FOR COOPER, RICHARD 
Utah county 
The State of Utah 
The united States of America, anno Domini 1791 
ADMINIS TRA TIVE 
JUDGMENT 
Claim AJ-2 7-21-98 
[RE: Identified as Amended Complaint, 27 Dec, AD 2002, Civil No. 020408808: Parties] 
[PACE v COOPER: Court, FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH] 
Jerry C. Cooper 
245 Astro Drive 
Kelso, Washington 
For Himself and Two Private Entities: 
COOPER FAMILY CHRISTIAN EQUITY TRUST 
aka# "CFT MANAGEMENT", and "CFT", 
CELESTIAL ORGANIZATION GROUP 
aka, "COG" 
Aggrieved Party/Creditor 
against 
RICHARD W. PACE, 1350 East 300 North 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
MARY J. PACE, 1350 East 300 North 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
RODNEY K. RIVERS, 497 North 800 East 
Lindon, Utah 84042 
LYNN W. DAVIS, Judge, % 125 North 100 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Aggressor (s) /Respondent (s) /Debtor {s) 
VERIFICATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD 
County of l44?ft/ititgH ) 
The State of tj •*•-; £ , Verified Declaration 
D e c l a r a n t s t a t e s t h a t he i s competent to be a w i t n e s s , 
t h a t t h e f a c t s c o n t a i n e d h e r e i n a r e t r u e , c o r r e c t and comple te , 
and no t m i s l e a d i n g , t o t h e b e s t of D e c l a r a n t ' s f i r s t hand knowledge 
amd b e l i e f under t h e p e n a l t y of p e r j u r y pursuant t o t h e Law of The 
S t a t e of MTeh . 
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I , your D e c l a r a n t , do t e s t i f y t h a t I have had i n my p o s s e s s i o n 
e a c h of t h e o r i g i n a l documents i d e n t i f i e d a s Track ing Numbers 7 - 2 1 -
98 -D1 AFFIDAVIT OF NOTICE AND DEMAND, and Tracking No. 7 - 2 1 - 9 8 - E 1 
NOTICE OF FAULT, and Track ing No. 7 - 2 1 - 9 8 - F 1 D e c l a r a t i o n and N o t i c e 
o f DEFAULT, DISHONOR and DECISION, and I have examined them and i t i s 
my f i n d i n g t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g p a r a g r a p h s , pages and c o n t e n t s a r e each 
a t r u e and c o r r e c t p r e s e n t m e n t a s found i n t h e o r i g i n a l i n s t r u m e n t s . 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD SHOWS THE FOLLOWING: 
T h i s Matter i s In t h e Nature o f an Independent P r i v a t e 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l N a t u r a l Law A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Remedy w h e r e i n : 
EQUALITY UNDER THE LAW IS PARAMOUNT AND MANDATORY UNDER LAW. 
The Following Definitions of Terms Apply Herein 
"NOTICE" means m any form, actual communicated knowledge of any f ac t , intended t o 
appraise a person of matters m which his in te res t are involved, which 
would put an ordinar i ly prudent person on inquiry from a proper source, wnen 
the sougnt to be affected by the not ice knows thereby, giving duty to the 
Party notified to take act ion, as may be 3ustified„ 
"commercial paper" means instruments used in the broadest sense of the term such 
as offers, c ra f t s , complaints, summons, warrants, e t c . which may involve 
accommoaation pa r t i e s or su re t i e s , including any type of business or a c t i v i t y 
wmch i s carried on for a p ro f i t , gain, enricnment or s a t i s f a c t i o n , or benef i t , 
"Stewardship" and "Trusteeship" means an appointee ! s dut ies who oversees the ca r ry -
ing out of the w i l l of the organisation pursuant to and in conformity <ath i t s 
authorizing indenture with consideration and meeting of minds under co: t r a c t . 
"Jury Trial" means as an "Amendment VIIM t r i a l by 12 jurors and does not mean an 
"aavisory ;;ury" wherein jfche jury lacks verdict power to bind the court . 
MTaxjDee£w meant instrument #81081, dated 15 hay, 1997, Utah County Recorder, Utah. 
"Fault^" means "Negligence; aid er ror or defect of judgment or of conduct; and 
deviation from prudence, duty or r ec t i tude ; any shortcoming or neglect of 
care or performance r e su l t i ng from inat tent ion , incapacity or pe rvers i ty ; 
a wrong tendency, course, or act ; bad fai th or mismanagement; neglect of du ty . 
The word connotes an ac t t o which blame, censure, impropriety, shortcoming 
or culpability a t t aches . " 
"Bad Faith" means "the opposite of good f a i t h , generally implying or involving 
acrual or constructive fraud, or a design -co mislead or deceive another, or 
a neglect or refusal t o f u l f i l l some duty of come cont rac tua l ob l iga t ion , not 
prompted by an honest mistake as to one's r igh ts or d u t i e s , but r a the r implies 
tne conscious doing or a wrong because of dishonest purpose or nc r a l a f f i r -
matively operating witn fu r t i ve design or i l l w i l l . " 
"Default" means 'By i t s der iva t ion , a f a i l u r e , an ommision of t h a t wmch ought t o 
oe done. Specif ical ly, the omission or fa i lure to perform a l ega l or 
contractual duty, t o ooserve a promise or discharge an ob l iga t i on ; or t o 
perform an agreement." 
"Co-e^tensive business agreement" means an agreement in equity brought about a f t e r 
receipt of a Notice of Fault wnerein there i s a f a i lu re t o respond, and such 
i s deemed as an acceptance of the fac t s as the s t i pu l a t ions t h e r e t o , and t n a t 
i s the co-extensive business agreement entered in to , which i s enforced i n equi ty . 
"Commercial Grace" means "72 hours of time" to be absolutely sure as t o the cause 
of lack of response t o a presentment, to affirm if for reason cf overs igh t , 
neglect, or ina t t en t ion t o no t ice , or to determine i f t he non-response was 
in fact in tent ional , malicious, and done with in tent t o do commercial harm. 
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The Following Definitions of Terms Apply Serein 
"Clearf ield Trust Doctrine" ifi stare- decisis and imposes Government courts to 
descend to level of a mere private corporation, and take on the ™ B C 3 ~ ~ 
istics of a mere private citizen.. .Where private corporate commercial papsx 
and securities is concerned.. .unless it is the Holder in Due Course at 
some contract or commercial agreement between it, and the one on whewi it 
deiT.ands for performance are made, and is willing to produce said Document, 
and to place the same into evidence before trying to enforce its ^f^' 
"Natural Law" means '-The law of nature dictated by God himself is binding in axx 
counties and at all times; no human laws are of any validity if con-.ary 
to this; and such of them as are valid derive all force and all their 
authority from this origin." (Blackstone's Commentaries of Law, i//t>; 
"ACCOMMODATION PARTY" means one who signs commercial paper in any capacity 
for the purpose of lending his name, to give credit, to another party ro 
instrument(s) signed: . 
"SURETY" means one at the request of another, for the purpose of securing to 
him a benefit, becomes responsible for the performance b y J ^ ^ J S L 0 ; , ™ 
some act in favor of a third party, herein includes the ACCOMMODATION PARTY. 
"Commercial Lien" means in the nature of a commercial lien and is not a lis pen 
lien, is not a statutory lien, and is not a common law lien, and does not 
require a court process for its establishment, validity or execution. 
"Right of Lien" means a right to enforce a charge upon property of another t°Z 
payment or satisfaction of a debt that is designated in United States ^ r t . 
"Lien Hold Claim" means a one hundred one year terra to enforce a Commercial _ ^ f* ' 
"Peace and DjcnTtv" means the inherited public order through Natural Law prin_.?A 
rvinr^ SnTTi countries, authoried by God as a gift to mankind, which Geo 
is referred to as the "Almighty God", the giver of all "rights". _ 
"TACIT PROCURATION" means by operation of law,"one person's silence gives power 
of attorney in fact to another person as proxy to act for the silent person, 
by the silent person's authority. . 
"Dae Process of Law" means: "Minimal procedural due process is that parties wnos 
rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard and, in order that they 
may enjoy that right, they must be notified." Cf .Puentes v Shevin, 407 « / » . 
"Condition of Commercial Fault" means Fault by negligence and Fault by bad ^aitn. 
"Dollars'V'S" means United States Dollars 
"AscTieved Party" means a Party entitled to resort to a remedy. 
Hotice of and Entry of DEPAULT 
This is a Notice of Default upon two iristruments titled AFFIDAVIT OF NOTICE 
AND DEMAND, Tracking No. 7-21-98-D1, with three Attachments, #1 is Administrative 
Record in 3 parts and the Administrative Judgment, £2 is Page one and two of Civil 
No. 02040B808, and #3 is a copy of ORDER Sated 7 January, AD 2004, and NOTICE OF 
FAULT, Timely Private Notice of Condition of Commercial Fault for Failure to 
Respond to AFFIDAVIT OF NOTICE AND DEMAND, Tracking No. 7-21-98-E1, with four 
proof of service Exhibits 1. 2. 3. and 4., as presented to the RESPONDENTS on the 
'•ffi day of Ob>\xr AD 2004, and on p* day of Hr-LLfy , & 2004, 
respectively. 
By the terms and conditions and pursuant to the provisions contained in said 
DEMAND, as to what would be acceptable as performance, RESPONDENTS' non answer is 
a positive act of performance under the terms and therefore created a binding 
contract wherein each RESPONDENT is under obligation individually to timely and 
in good faith answer, object, rebut, refute, and/or otherwise respond. Accordingly 
each RESPONDENTS' failure to respond places each RESPONDENT individually at 
DEFAULT, and DEFAULT is hereby Entered. 
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By said DEFAULT, each RESPONDENT, indiv idual ly , i s deemed to be in BAD FAITH 
and NEGLIGENT i n f a i l i n g t o respond and adjudicate any problems between CREDITOR 
and RESPONDENTS. As a d i r ec t and approximate r e s u l t of t h i s default RESPONDENTS), 
several ly and j o i n t l y , are estopped from bringing any a c t or actions against t h e 
CREDITOR as t o the following factual ISSUES, l i s t e d i n sa id FAULT as Items 1 , 2 & 3 . 
1. Jer ry C. Cooper i s a Beneficiary to the Original organic law Jur i sd ic t ion* 
2. Paragraphs "IV." and "V." of "CONCLUSIONS OF LAW/* of ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGMENT 
#AJ 7-21-98, are va l id , in force and b inding . 
3. Each Verif ied ISSUE of Fact for Establishment of CLAIMS and OBLIGATIONS, 
ISSUE #1 through and including ISSUE #72 i s deemed a s a d m i t t e d 
u n d i s p u t e d P a c t by TACIT PROCURATION, S t a r e D e c i s i s . -
N o t i c e of and E n t r y of DISHONOR 
Each RESPONDENTS';failure to respond to the NOTICE OF FAULT within th ree 
days a f te r r ece ip t , r esu l ted in a DEFAULT there to , being issued with DISHONOR 
Entered* A DISHONOR cons t i t u t e s a s t ipu la t ion t o , and an admission of, the 
fac t s contained in the "Notice of Each RESPONDENTS Stipulations/Admissions 
pursuant t o Notice of Faul t" , which l i s t s Items 1 . , 2 . and 3 . above* The 
p r inc ip l e , "Notice to agent i s not ice to p r inc ipa l , and Notice to Pr incipal i s 
not ice to a l l agents ," appl ies herein* 
Not i c e of and E n t r y o f DECISION 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD SHOWS THE FOLLOWING: 
F I N D I N G S 0 F F A C T 
A. On t h e 3 ^ _ day of ^yfejjasr , AD 2004, Jerry C. Cooper, he re ina f t e r 
"Creditor", did cause se?viceupon RICHARD W. PACE, MARY J . PACE, RODNEY W. 
RIVERS, AND LYNN W. DAVIS, hereinaf ter "Debtor(s)", individual ly, with a 
t rue and correc t copy of an instrument t i t l e d AFFIDAVIT OF NOTICE AND DEMAND, 
Tracking No. 7-21-98-D1, hereinaf ter ".DEMAND",'with three Attachments. 
B. That examination of Credi tor ' s p r iva te f i l e s and records in t h i s cause shows 
tha t each RESPONDENT was served by pr iva te or U.S. Mail service a t r ue and 
cor rec t copy of DEMAND on the > ^ day of ^tfit^Uer . AD 2004, a copy of 
proof of service i s attached hereto as Exhibits 1, 2, 3 , and 4. 
C That more than twenty-one calendar days, as were provided, have elapsed 
since the day each RESPONDENT was served with a copy of DEMAND, excluding 
the date thereof, and no RESPONDENT has made a response to current d a t e . 
D. On the f^M day of Qch^tr ,AD 2004, Creditor did cause serv ice upon each 
RESPONDENT, individual ly , with a t rue and correc t copy of an instrument t i t l e d 
NOTICE OF FAULT, "Timely Private Notice of Condition of Commercial Faul t fo r 
Fai lure to Respond to AFFIDAVIT OF NOTICE AND DEMAND, Tracking No. 7-21-98-E1, 
with four proof of service Exhibits 1 . , 2. ,.:3.>-and 4 . 
E. That examination of Cred i to r ' s pr iva te f i l e s and records in t h i s cause shows 
tha t each RESPONDENT was served by pr ivate or U.S* Mail service a t r u e and 
cor rec t copy of NOTICE OF FAULT on "the /2& day of &£*ke>T AD 2004, a 
copy of proof of service i s attached hereto as Exhibits 5, 6, 7, and 8 . 
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F. That three (3) calendar days, as an add i t iona l 72 hours of commercial g r a c e , 
a f t e r rece ip t of said NOTICE OF FAULT, as was provided, have elapsed s i n c e 
t h e day each RESPONDENT was served with a copy of NOTICE OF FAULT, excluding 
t h e day of serv ice , and no RESPONDENT has made a response within th ree (3) 
days , and has made no response t o cu r ren t da te . 
6 . Each RESPONDENT herein has fa i l ed t o answer a l l said instruments and otherwise 
d id not meet the requirements of the instruments and tha t the requirements 
fo r entry of Default, Dishonor, and Decision by Creditor are met* 
H. On or about the 2 6 ^ day of OekA>ef AD 2004, Creditor did enter upon 
the Administrative Record a DEFAULT, DISHONOR, and DECISION and each RESPOND-
ENT was served a t rue and correc t copy of same as a 90 day Statement b i l l i n g . 
A copy of proof of service i s a t tached here to as Exhibits 9, 10, 11 , and 12. 
C O N C L U S I O N S O F L A W 
Foundational Preface from "OOMCLUSIONS OF LAW", ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGMENT AJ 7-21-98 
Effective: 14 September, AD 1998, nunc pro tunc 
"IV. RICHARD W. PACE and MARY J. PACE have abandon all legal claims as may be, 
applied against the COOPER FAMILY CHRISTIAN EQUITY TRUST, a trust, 
Washington county, State of Utah, and their SUCCESSORS and ASSIGNS as may 
be, to the following described tract of land in Utah County, State of Utah: 
COM 415.10 FT S OF NE COR, BLK 8, PLAT C, PROVO CITY SURVEY: 
E 66.84 FT; S 89*30 FT; K 66.84 FT; N 89.30 FT TO HBG. 
AREA .14 OF AN ACRE. 
"V. RICHARD W* PACE and/or MARY J. PACE, their successors and assigns as may be, 
may not argue, controvert, or otherwise protest the administrative findings 
entered, as based upon PACE'S Default to CFT's administrative process, nor 
in any subsequent administrative or judicial proceeding, wherein the CCOPSR 
FAMILY CHRISTIAN EQUITY TRUST, a trust, Washington, county, State of Utah, 
and their SUCCESSORS and-ASSIGNS as may be, has the right to take the 
subject matter to any court that they may choose." 
NDTE: Two case numb-ers have appeared on the pleadings, as No. 020405508 and 020408808, 
#1 RESPONDENT Lynn W. Davis works at 125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601, 
and is employed as a district court officer, judge. This RESPONDENT is 
named in his individual private capacity. 
#2 RESPONDENT Rodney W. Rivers lives at 497 North 800 East, Lindon, Utah 84042, 
and is employed by R. Pace and M. Pace RESPONDENTS, as a Court officer attorney 
at law. This RESPONDENT is natoed in his individual private capacity. 
£3 RESPONDENTS Richard W. Pace and Mary J. Pace, individually, live at 1350 
East 300 North, American Fork, Utah 84003, and each is a complainant. Each 
RESPONDENT is named in his and her individual private capacity. 
U It is deemed a concluded fact that Richard W. Pace, Mary J. Pace, Rodnev W. 
Rivers, and Lynn W. Davis are each an ACCOMMODATION PARTY for RICHARD W* PACE, 
-5-
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MARY J. PACE, RODNEY W. RIVERS, ,and LYNN W. DAVIS, respectively, by their acts 
and actions of individually signing commercial paper for the purpose of lending 
his/her name, to give credit, to another party to instrument(s) signed, and 
at the request of another, and for the purpose of securing to him/her a benefit, 
each is a SURETY, respectively, and become responsible for the performance 
by the latter • 
#5 RICHARD W. PACE, MARY J* PACE, RODNEY W. RIVERS, and LYNN W. DAVIS, are jointly 
and severally RESPONDENT parties to this DEMAND, hereinafter "RESPONDENT(S),f. 
#6 On or about 11 December, AD 2002, R. Pace and M. Pace, contracted with R. Rivers 
to represent their private interest; and thereafter R. Rivers contracted with^ 
the public Court to have L. Davis, 3udge, to provide both plaintiff and defend-
ants due process of law judicial process in Civil No. 020408808, as a condition 
of contract, prior to entering the jurisdiction of the court, or judgment. 
#7 R. Pace and M. Pace amended their complaint on 27 December, AD 2002, which 
centered on a Tax Deed purchased by R. Pace and M. Pace on 15 May, AD 1997, 
to land owned by CFT earlier to which R. Pace and M.Pace did claim a S2% 
interest and sought in case No* 020408808: 
1. Partition to sell Tax Deed pi.or;:>rty and divide proceeds, 53^, 37%. 
2. By conversion/exclusion lost income of $50,000, May 1997 to Jan. 2003. 
3. Quiet title to secure 63% interest in property. 
4. For wrongful lien by successor owners of $10,000.00. 
#8 CREDITOR commenceito timely answer the Pace complaint by bringing before the 
Court substantive rights issues, with the primary controversy being the Court's 
bar against the CREDITOR'S free exercise of secured and protected Natural Law 
(international) constitutional rights and substantive civil rights to defend 
and protect land and property under his stewardship contracts and as need to 
speak for CFT, COG and JERRY 20, and not to be impaired in doing so. 
#9 CREDITOR further demanded on and before, and after, 23 May, AD 2003, by a 
Petition in writing for a Trial by Jury, the fee having been satisfied, to 
obtain a court of justice trial by jury and not an advisory "type" jury* 
#10 On 23 May, AD 2003, CREDITOR gave personal NOTICE to each RESPONDENT with a 
CAVEAT concerning his authorization to appear under contract obligations for 
any and all entities under his charge as a private contract right; and claimed 
all rights, privileges and immunities as secured and protected, giving express 
and implied NOTICE* as to invasion of said rights under Webster Bivens, 403 US 
388, inter alia, and 42 USC 1986, 1985 and 1983, if RESPONDENTS should so do. 
#11 On or aboux 12 June, AD 2003, R. Pace, K. Pace and R. Rivers sought for an 
ORDER fro:a L. Davis, judge, as follows: 
1. To Disqualify CREDITOR from acting as legal counsel for COG and CFT. 
2. To strike all pleadings/documents'by CREDITOR for CFT and COG. 
3. JERRY 20, C?Tf and COG have twenty (20) days to hire a legal counsel. 
#12 On or about 12 June, AD 2003, L. Davis, judge, ordered R. Rivers to prepare 
an Order barring CREDITOR from appearing for JERRY 20, CFT and COG. 
-*-
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#13 On and before, and af te r , CREDITOR demanded that L. Davis, judge, t o show his 
authorization of law on the record which would support h i s ORDER ba r r i ng 
CREDITOR to defend under h i s stewardship contract(s) in CFT, COG or o t h e r s . 
#14 At no time did any RESPONDENT reveal t o CREDITOR any authori ty t o support the 
ORDER to disbar or disqualify the CREDITOR from defending under h i s c o n t r a c t s . 
#15 On^or about 12 December, AD 2003, RESPONDENT R. Rivers al leged in h i s proposed 
order that CREDITOR was "not l icensed to pract ice law in the s t a t e (for emphasis 
see #16) of Utah from represent ing the Cooper Family Chris t ian Equity Trus t , 
the Celestial Organization Group, and the Jerry 20 Charitable T r u s t , " 
#16 I t i s deemed a concluded fac t t h a t i t was RESPONDENTS1, R. Rivers and L. Davis, 
claim, by the use and acceptance of the lower case n s" in the term " s t a t e of 
Utah", that i t was " the i r" i n t e n t tha t the republic Utah, 1896, and t h e 
Republic United States of America, 1789, did not secure and p ro t ec t t h e 
CREDITOR'S private ( in te rna t iona l ) Natural Law cons t i tu t ional r i g h t s , 
pr ivi leges and immunities on and before 7 January, AD 2004. 
*
1 ?
 U 1 £ ^ \ ? ™ S ' *f™™E™ L- ^ v i s , accepted the proposed Order of 
12 December, AD 2003, and did s t r i k e a l l of the CREDITOR'S pleadings and 
T Z , n f OT ? fXS,and j U r Y t r i a 1 ' * * < * CTeated • * * « * t by the s t r i k i n g 
2 ^ ! ^ f T S * P l e a d i n 5 s of CFT and COG to the PACE Complaint, and then order-
S i S i w S S ^ f y t 0 ** s o l d giving M. Pace and R. Pace, 63* of t h e s a l e 
p.xce, plus 550,000.00 in l o s t income and 510,000.00 for wrongful l i e n claim. 
# 1 8
 Sei^tefst^ ^fUJ\mhtSl 1 7 9 1 ' d i d toend *"• Const i tut ion of t r» united States , 1789, which made c lear tha t men's r i a h t s D- iv i lea-s and 
S S 1 ^ ^ * r e S S C U r e d * * P r ° t e c t e d ^*>y> wereInos'e S S l s t S c e 
v S u e / w t 2 L w f e u P r ° h i b i t e d from being impaired by the l e g i s l a t i v e 
s S t e S S S t S t " ,* m i ^ STkTES Emcoxporat im], including a l l fu ture 
a t i o n 3 ! T a ^ , V S U 2 0 ^ 1 S d l C t i O n S ' ^ ^ * * S T A I * °? OTAH ^ c o r p o r -
m
 S S n S ^ ^ J a " u a r y - "> 2 0 0 ^ fay the concerted act ions of a i l RESPONDENTS 
r e o S S L n 2 3 tf*00** «* e x e = u t e 3 « * « color of S ta te s t a t u t e , ordinance, 
regulat ion, eustom, or usage. See Attachment #3 herewith as a t rue copy. 
£20 
#21 
#22 
S u " a7d c o ? f ! ° n ° r ^ * 2 0 3anuar*> to 2 0 0 3 . received actual NOTICE of a 
TinTtdYn^l^?y ? ^ ^ F a U l t " ^ I > £ f a U l t ' P 8 " * o f Attachment #1 
of tne Administrative Record without the Administrative Judgment. 
S c S S S ^ ^ ^ ^ N 0 T I C E to ** C R E D I T O R ° f * » * s t a t u t e < ordinance, 
a t t o r n e d vtl + " ? ? ^ C O ! n p e n e d a * ™ ™ ' * performance to h i r e an 
PTOP^tv 'ofco? ? ? / I S 0 " ( U S B 2 6 8 4 ) ' t 0 r e t r i e v e the l o ^ land and FLope.uy of COG, CFT, and JERRY 20, as may be. 
p S S ^ h t ^ h o ^ ^ J - P a C e ' h a V e C l £ i m e d s i n c e " Kay, AD 1997, t h e date 
S a t P ^ 2 h J ^ H ^ / K * * ^ P r o ^ t y , «P to 12 D u m b e r , AD 2003, 
be^e f iSn t fSm th g « ? - h 3 V e b e e n ? r o h i b i t e d or r e s t r i c t e d fro*, using or 
c e n - t i ^ n g from t h e i r 63% in t e re s t r i g h t in the Tax Deed property. 
- 7 -
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#23 That examination of CFT's private files and all records available to. the 
Creditor shows that there has been no contact or communication from any Pace or 
Pace representative, from 15 May, AD 1997,«through to 11 December, AD 2002, 
evidencing a claim, demand or a request of any kind seeking to have access to; 
or use of, or to seek a benefit from, in regard to Pace's Tax Deed claim. 
#24 Ihat examination of CFT's private files and all records available to the 
CREDITOR shows that there is no contract or communication from any Pace, or 
Pace representative, from 15 Kay, AD 1997 through to 11 December, AD 2002, 
evidencing a claim or demand for compensation in lieu of use of Tax Deed land, 
#25 That examination of the exclusive administrative record (available for judicial 
review), as Attachment #1 , shows that RESPONDENTS R. Pace and M. Pace have 
been fully, lawfully ana equitably, compensated or satisfied for whatever 
interest that may have been due them as to the Pace Tax Deed investment. 
#26 On or about 23 Kay, AD 2003, all RESPONDENTS were given NOTICE that CREDITOR'S 
responsibilities under stewardship contract obligations as Trustee/Director 
are of a protecting nature and none of the activities performed by the Trustee/ 
Director can be construed as the "practice of law" by the Creditor, as the office 
of "protector" is a custom and a private (international) Natural Law right 
long enjoyed and secured for trustees of private trusts from time immorial. 
#27 As a direct result of RESPONDENTS1 concerted actions to seek and obtain the 
ORDER of 7 January, AD 2004, did cause injury by impairment of CREDITOR'S 
rights in contracts and others under color of State law a^d the CREDITOR was 
compelled to make a considerable outlay of private funds to hire Mr, Vincent 
C. Hampton (USB 2584), attorney, to stop the injury and to try to make good 
the wrong done by the RESPONDENTS, jointly and severally. 
#28 On 7 January, AD 2004^ RESPONDENT L. Davis, judge,, did execute an ORDER and 
Court did execute the proposed "Findings of Pact, Conclusions of law and 
Order of Judgment" bearing a mailing date of 12 December, AD 2003. 
#29 The Parties 
a. Is being brought by Jerry C. Cooper, Record Owner, Notice of Interest 
Creditor, herein "CREDITOR/Creditor", for himself, and as Successor Trustee 
for private COOPER FAMILY CHRISTIAN EQUITY TRUST, aka CFT MANAGEMENT, aka 
CFT, and as Director for private CELESTIAL ORGANIZATION GROUP, aka COG, 
245 Astro Drive 
Kelso, Washington [near 98626] 
b. [A Real Party of Interest, Noticee] 
[STATE OF UTAH (Incorporation), Officers, agents, successors, counsels, etc.] 
[Governor, UTAH STATE CAPITOL 3UILDING, % UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL] 
[UTAH STATE CAPITOL BUILDING] 
[Salt Lake City, Utah] 
Is being brought against Notice of Interest Respondents, herein "RESPONDENTS/ 
Debtors", jointly and severally [In Fraud under Color of Law/Office], 
RICHARD W. PACE 
MARY J. PACE 
1350 East 300 North 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
-8-
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RODNEY W. RIVERS, Attorney at Law 
4S7 North 800 East 
Lindonr Utah 84042 
Honorable LYNN W. DAVIS, District Court Judge 
% 125 North 100 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
This is NOTICE OF REJECTION OF OFFER TO CONTRACT by Special Appearance. 
This matter is In the nature of an Independent Private International 
Natural Law Administrative Remedy, 
On or about 12 June, AD 2003, in Utah, and in consideration of the foregoing 
ISSUES of Fact, #1 through #30, RESPONDENTS,R. Pace, M. Pace, and R. Rivers 
sought for an ORDER from the 'Court which was granted on or about 12 December, 
AD 2003, by RESPONDENT L. Davis, judge, which ORDER was under color of Utah 
statutes, ordinance, regulation, custoro, or usage, subjected CREDITOR as a 
person within the jurisdiction of the United States of America to the 
oeprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitutions 
and laws of Utah and the United States of America, which did interfere with 
the CREDITORS Natural Law constitutional rights and civil rights by 
impairment under color of State law, which ORDER in force and effect did 
strike all pleadings, all defenses, and other documents filed in the Court 
by the CREDITOR,, for and in the capacity of a commissioned and authorized 
Director and Trustee under a private stewardship contract to protect all 
Land and property of the private Celestial Organization Group, and private 
JERRY 20 Charitable Trust, and the private Cooper Family Christian Equity 
Trust, each created under private (international) Natural Law, secured and 
protected under the Bill of Rights, 1791, Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States, 1789, [Republic](without the legislative venue/jurisdiction 
of the UNITED STATES [Incorporation]), and the ORDER did strike the contract 
with the Court for a Trial by Jurv court of justice
 r the fee having been 
satisfied for Civil No. 020408808. the .said act did not preserve to the 
CREDITOR his stewardship contract under provision's cnmnwrti of Art* I, Sec. 
10, CI. Llj, "No State shall...pass any...Law impairing the Obliaation of 
Contracts,...«, aid Amendment [V, 1791], "No person shall be. • .deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;...", Constitution of 
the Urn tea States, 1789, [Republic 3 (without the legislative venue/jurisdiction 
of the UNITED STATES [Incorporation]); it has been deemed that violating, 
oepriving, trespassing on, or interfering with, secured constitutional 
rights, privileges, or immunities, is an offense so serious that it is 
S ^ ? K ^ S f a C ^ ° ? ' " ^ y obtained by payment of money damages, thus 
S S 2 S ? ^ ? *** ** j a U ' ** " r i g h t S W e r e demanded klOR to 
a f S n ^ § ^ ^ °U3ht t 0 * d0l*led (as " ^ for road construction 
Sr^iltrr * SJO W^O W!! warninB>r * * in consideration of Title 28 USC 1331(a), 
SclS^ % a ; r l g h ^ **"* ""st "exceed the sum of value of 550,000.00, 
S S S I t ^ i T t ^ t ^ C°S?"' ** the C R E D I T O R i s *^tled to a^d hereby 
O^m^^S^J^9 ? dama9eS M jUSt " " P ^ t i ™ in the amount of 
^ ^ ^ S S S S ^ S 5 ^ 8 5 D:>llars ($100,000.00), jointly and severally, 
r^oin each RESPONDENT. [ [Cf. 42 USC 1983 and Bivens v. 6 Agents (1971)3 
: "Cf.' 
means compare for contrastedr analogous, or explanatory view. 
-9-
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[Note: Conclusions of Law #32 through and including #72 have not been reproduced 
herein but by reference are made a part hereof in full hereinat as found 
in the Declaration and Notice of DEFAULT, DISHONOR and DECISION, Tracking 
No. 7-21-98-F1. However,,#31 has been set out in full above to show format 
example used in each of the other forty-one (41) individual and separate 
Conclusions of Law, each different and distinct. Verified or plain true 
copies may be obtained from the Record Owner for a reasonable fee. Each 
RESPONDENT/Debtor was given individual notice on or about 23 May, AD 2003, 
that Creditor was an aggrieved party who had demanded all of his secured 
rights and gave CAVEAT that remedy or relief in the nature of Title 42 
United States Code 1983, 1985, or 1986 may be sought as well as Bivens vs. 
Six Agents, 403 US 388, 29 LEd2d 619, 915 S.Ct 1999, may be considered if 
secured rights are invaded, deprived or otherwise impaired.] 
D E C I S I O N 
A c c o r d i n g l y , 
I. IT IS THE DECISION Dased upon the factual and legal determina-
tions of the Findings of fact and Conclusions of Law that 
Richard W* Pace, Mary J. Pace, Rodney W. Rivers, and Lynn W. 
Davis, are each an ACCOMMODATION PARTY and SURETY bound with 
RICHARD W. PACE, MARY J. PACE, RODNEY W. RIVERS, and LYNN W. 
DAVIS, respectfully, as Debtors, severally and jointly, for the 
payment or satisfaction of all liability, debt or obligations 
incurred in NOTICE and DEMAND, Tracking No. 7-21-98-Dl, and 
other charges or fees which may be incurred in any collection 
actions through PESPONDENTS/Debtors' failure to honor said 
liability, debfor obligations. 
II. IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION based* upon the factual and legal 
determinations of the Findings of Fact, A. through and includ-
ing H.f and Conclusions of Lav/, #1 through and including #72, 
that each ISSUE does address "the acts, duties or relationship of 
RESPONDENT as public persons, who have each acted in some 
capacity as agents, for themselves or others, which acts have 
been deemed prejudicial to Creditor's secured Constitutional 
rights, privileges or liberty interests. 
III. IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION based upon the factual and legal 
determinations of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
that ISSUES #1 through and including #30 must be construed as 
part of each ISSUE, #31 through and including #72; in that context 
it has been deemed that each ISSUE, #31 through and including 
#72, constitutes a separate and distinct act wherein Creditor's 
secured Natural Law rights, privileges, or immunities and/or 
Constitutional rights, privileges, or immunities, have been by 
each RESPONDENT, jointly and severally, impaired or deprived 
under color of the Utah law by conspiracy did cause injury and 
damaged to the Creditor, as defined by each ISSUE independently. 
-10-
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IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION based upon the factual and legal 
determinations of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of^ Law, 
it has been deemed that damages as just compensation in the 
sum of value of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND United States Dollars 
(5100,000.00) for each ISSUE, #31 through and including £71, 
is an equitable amount and is the decision. 
IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION based upon the factual and legal 
determinations of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of ^aw, 
it has been deemed as to ISSUE #31 through and including #72, 
that the following amount in sum value of FOUR MILLION TWO 
HUNDRED THOUSAND United States Dollars ($4,200,000.00), const-, 
itutes the total Debt due and owing, by each RESPONDENT as 
Debtor, severally and jointly, with no interest thereon, to the 
Creditor, Jerry C. Cooper, his heirs, representatives, or 
assigns, as may be. 
IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION based upon the factual and legal 
determinations of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
that upon service of a true and correct copy of the instrument 
identified as DEFAULT, DISHONOR and DECISION, upon each RESPOND^ 
ENT/Debtor, does constitute a Statement and Demand for payment 
or satisfaction in full, of the Debt sum due is FOUR MILLION 
TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND United States Dollars ($4,200,000.00), 
with no interest thereon. 
IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION based upon the factual and legal 
determinations of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
that the said Statement and Demand for payment is a "true bill 
in commerce1' wherein each RESPONDENT/Debtor-, 'severally and 
jointly, have ninety (90) days after service of same in which 
to pay or satisfy the Debt or obligation to the Creditor, or 
his agent, Wayne Rulan Bevan, agent, %3865 No. Quail Summit 
Lane, Provo, Utah [84604], and thereafter said "account receiv-
able0 becomes a "commercial lien" and can attach to property. 
IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION based on the governing law of a 
"true bill in commerce" that anytime after ninety (90) days, 
after receipt of Statement, that if there is an unpaid or 
unsatisfied Debt balance due to the Creditor, the Creditor, or 
his heirs or assigns, as may be, has a Right of Lien to execute 
a Lien Hold Claim in the amount of the unpaid or unsatisfied 
Debt obligation, as may be, against any and all property of 
each RESPONDENT/Debtor1s property, and all that which may be 
distressed/arrested/impounded/use-suspended as may be in third 
party custody, until the 1st day of January, AD 2105, defined 
as a Lien Hold Claim, as a term of one hundred one years. 
["The ability to place a lien upon a man's property such as 
to temporarily deprive him of its beneficial use, without any 
judicial determination of probable cause dates back not only 
to medieval England but also to Roman times.11 Cf. Sniadach v. 
-11-
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Family Finance Corp., 395 US 337, 349 (1968), supported by 
the California Supreme Court, 1971, Bandone v* Appellate Dept, 
5 C3d 536, 96 Cal Rptr 709, and 448 P2d .3 
IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION based upon the factual and legal 
determinations of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
that Creditor's Right of Lien is in the nature of a commercial 
lien and is not a lis pendens lien, is not a statutcry lien, 
and is not a common law lien, and does not require a court 
process for its establishment, validity, or execution and it 
cannot be removed by summary process (judge's discretion), nor 
by anyone except the authorized person, who alone holds the 
Right of Lien to the Lien Hold Claim(s), as may be. 
IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION based upon the factual and legal 
determinations of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
that said AFFIDAVIT OF NOTICE AND DEMAND constitutes a TRUE 
BILL IN COMMERCE established by Creditor's Statement under 
affidavit, certified and sworn as to ledgering, or accounting, 
with every entry, by number, verified and sworn as true, correct 
and complete, and not misleading, in good faith and not in bad 
faith, under penalty of periury, which has been further assented 
to by each RESPONDENT/Debtor* 
IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION that the authorized person having 
the Right of Lien, to the Lien Hold Claim(s), may open by 
administrative procedure for further remedy or relief until the 
attainment of the ends of justice have been satisfied anytime 
prior to the 1st day of January, AD 2105. 
Further Declarant says not. 
Given under my hand and seal this the 
)12L day of /1/a t/&>*h*>JFW 2004. 
nkdarant: '"/ , ^ , 
Cpr-xntiD j S , ^ * £jV~ \\ ^M ff S V ft/ P11 S o n 
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Cla im AJ-2 7 - 2 1 - 9 8 
I , t h e H e a r i n g O f f i c e r , d e c l a r e t h a t I am l e a r n e d i n t h e Law a n d 
h a v e knowledge of t h e p r i n c i p l e s and p r o c e d u r e s r e q u i r e d f o r 
t h e e x h a u s t i o n of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e m e d i e s and I am c o m p e t e n t 
t o make an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e t e r m i n a t i o n . 
I , t h e H e a r i n g O f f i c e r , a c t i n g i n t h e c a p a c i t y of an A d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
R e v i e w e r , h a v e d e t e r m i n e d from t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e c o r d t h a t 
t h e c o r r e c t p r o c e s s h a s been c o m p l e t e d . 
The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e c o r d shows t h a t R i c h a r d W. P a c e , Kary J . P a c e , 
Rodney W. R i v e r s , and Lynn W. D a v i s , e a c h h a s s t i p u l a t e d t o t h e 
" F o u n d a t i o n a l P r e f a c e from "CONCLUSIONS OF LAW", ADMINISTRATIVE 
JUDGMENT, AJ 7 - 2 1 - 9 8 , E f f e c t i v e : 14 S e p t e m b e r , AD 1 9 9 8 , n u n c 
p r o t u n c " a s a d m i t t e d u n d i s p u t e d f a c t by TACIT PROCURATION, 
S t a r e D e c i s i s , a s f o l l o w s : 
"IV. RICHARD W. PACE and MARY J . PACE have abandon a l l l ega l claims as may be, 
applied agains t the COOPER FAMILY CHRISTIAN EQUITY TRUST, a t r u s t , 
Washington county, State of Utah, and t h e i r SUCCESSORS and ASSIGNS as may 
be, to the following described t r ac t of land in Utah County, S ta te of Utah: 
COM 415.10 FT E OF NE COR, BLK 3, PLAT C, PROVO CITY SURVEY: 
E 66.84 FT; S 89.30 FT; W 66.84 FT; N 89.30 FT TO BEG. 
AREA .14 OF AN ACRE. 
,rV. RICRARD W. PACE and/or MARY J . PACE, their, successors and assigns as may be, 
may not argue, controvert , or otherwise pro tes t the adminis t ra t ive f indings 
entered, as based upon PACE'S Default t o CFT's adminis t ra t ive process , nor 
in any subsequent administrat ive or j ud i c i a l proceeding, wherein t h e COOPER 
FAMILY CHRISTIAN EQUITY TRUST, a t r u s t , Washington, county, Sta te of Utah, 
and t h e i r SUCCESSORS and ASSIGNS as may be, has the r i g h t to take t h e 
subject matter to any court tha t they may choose.'1 
The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e c o r d shows t h a t R i c h a r d W. P a c e , Mary J . P a c e , 
Rodney W, R i v e r s , and Lynn W. D a v i s , e a c h h a s s t i p u l a t e d t o t h e 
FINDINGS OF FACT, A. t h r o u g h and i n c l u d i n g H . , a s a d m i t t e d 
u n d i s p u t e d f a c t by TACIT PROCURATION, S t a r e D e c i s i s . 
The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e c o r d shows t h a t R i c h a r d W. P a c e , Mary J . P a c e , 
Rodney W. R i v e r s , and Lynn W. D a v i s , e a c h h a s s t i p u l a t e d t o t h e 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, I s s u e #1 t h r o u g h and i n c l u d i n g I s s u e # 7 2 , 
a s a d m i t t e d u n d i s p u t e d f a c t by TACIT PROCURATION, S t a r e D e c i s i s . 
A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e c o r d shows t h a t DECISION h a s been 
e n t e r e d a g a i n s t R i c h a r d W. P a c e , Kary J . P a c e , Rodney W. R i v e r s , 
and Lynn W. D a v i s , and i n f a v o r of J e r r y C. C o o p e r , f o r h i m s e l f , 
and a s S u c c e s s o r T r u s t e e f o r p r i v a t e COOPER FAMILY CHRISTIAN 
EQUITY TRUST, aka CFT MANAGEMENT, aka CFT, and a s D i r e c t o r f o r 
p r i v a t e CELESTIAL ORGANIZATION GROUP, aka COG. 
- 1 3 -
ENT 1 2 8 7 6 8 : 2 0 0 4 PG 14 of 35 
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGMENT 
Claim AJ-2 7-21-98 
As an operation of Law, administrative admitted facts are not 
subject to reconsideration in any action in Law, Commerce, or 
otherwise. 
JUDGMENT IS SO ENTERED• 
Given under my hand and seal this the 
JJL d*y of ftJotJetflp*>i< . AD 2004. 
t:.. 'H* 
Administrati 
'V* &' 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, personally appeared before me 
<£rtn^ TrV ScuMtS Oct \$0v\ . and upon proper identification, did 
execute the foregoing ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGMENT on this P K day of 
AD 2004, 
Seal 
NOTARY PtJBLIC 
BECWT HANSEN 
1K5 WEST RED CUFFS DFUVE 
WASHINGTON, t/TAH MT60 
COMM. EXPIRES 4-29-2006 
Prepared and submitted on this Y day of /VWl (*t 6> Gt~ AD 2004, 
J^ry C* Cooper, Creditor 
-14-
<^*>1W ra i t I 
RETURN OF SERVICE 
EHT i a 8 7 & 8 : E 0 0 4 P6 15 of 35 
c iv i l ppx:ess% Person 
Name: \\j^/){C CU&< 
Address: 
City/State: 
Service Fee 
Ui»'Z S 
P QiVS 
>C/f0& 
<.<r 
Tracking NO. 7-21-98-D2 
I hereby depose and say that I am a citizen of the United States of America, I am 
over the age of 21 years at the time of service and not a party to or interested 
in this action. That I served a copy of the following documents and offered an 
inspection of the originals in my possession. I placed my endorsement on the copy 
of the documents served. I declare under penalty of perjury that the information 
in this Return of Service is true and correct. 
I Served: RICHARD W. PACE 
At: 1350 East 300 *fc>rth 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Or other place where served: 
On the y day of ^^{t+nixLS-
At the .Hour of 3-30 a.m. ( 
, 20 d *f. „ 
) p.m. ( nCheck 
Documents Served: AFFIDAVIT OF NOTICE AND DEMAND, Tracking No. 7-21-98-D1, with: 
* Attachment #1 is Admin. Record in 3 Parts and Administrative Judgment AJ-1 7-21-98 
Attachment #2 is page one and two of Civil Complaint No. 020408808 
Attachment #3 is a copy of ORDER dated 7 January, AD 2004 
Kanner of Service 
([/) I personally served upon: Richard W. Pace 
( ) I left copies thereof at above location with person of suitable age and 
discretion then therein residing; 
Name of person with whom left: 
D .J-S? 
Process Server, Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWDRN TO before me this ^ day of Sl(HfVV\W^ 20 Q*\ 
My Commission Expires: t^iRO/O^ 
Residing At: 
Return To: Jerry C. Cooper 
245 Astro Drive 
Kelso, Washimton [98626] 
J A M 
tary Public 
(_M^J OOi (JAC^-^ 
Seal 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
ANN MARIE MICKELSEN 
1060 N Unrverstty Avenue 
ProvoUT 64604 
My Commission Expires 
March 20, 2007 
STATE OF UTAH 
EHT 1 2 8 7 6 8 : 2 0 0 4 PG 16 of 35 
AFFIDAVIT OF NOTICE AND DEMAND ( for Establishment of CLAIMS and OBLIGATIONS) 
NOTICE OF PRIVATE COMMERCIAL AFFIDAVIT 
NOTICE OF NON-JUDICIAL PROCEEDING U.S. C e r t i f i e d Mail Number 
Return R e c e i p t Requested 
NOTICE OF PRE-JUDICIAL PROCEEDING 
Tracking No. 7-21-98-D1 
FAIR NOTICE AND KARKING OF COMMERCIAL GRACE 
RESPONSE REQUIRED FROM 
THIS I S A U . S . S .E .C. TRACER FLAG* EACH RESPONDENT WITHIN 
NOT A. POINT OF LAW, A SECURITY (15 USC) TWENTY-ONE ( 2 1 ) DAYS 
ASSEVERATION; 
the State of \*Atsfn^{gy ) 
the united States of America ) 
. Vfcskuvqft*,
 k ^ A '$$2~ffiU 
L.S. V*- :K^V 
W^t^f*,  . p  
Benefid^arj^^the Osjiginal Jurisdiction • r. p;y 
I, Jerry C. Cooper, in correct public capacity as beneficiary to the 
Original Jurisdiction, being of majority in age, competent to testify, self-
realized entities, free man upon the land, my yes be yes, my no be no, do state 
to the best of py first hand personal knowledge ana belief that the truths 3.nd 
facts herein said are true, correct and complete, and not misleading, in good 
faith, and not in bad faith, under penalty of perjury. 
Certificate of Witness 
I, /Mzlba: Ql$*!** % cert i fy that I know and can ident i fy 
the signature of Jerry C. Cooper, on the above asseveration, i s true and that 
said signature was not signed under duress or undue influence* 
Dated th i s 3&_ day of /}u#U$f~ , 
AD 2004, at &CLW1 er} f)& • Third Party Witness 
Personal 
From: Jerry C. Cooper, Record CXacer Service I f Made: 
Location: 245 Astro Drive D,<r h, ^ t P* r <^  
Kelso, Washington [near 98626] To, fr/C/^^^ 
Tims: O O O 
Reference: Date: 
Mended Complaint, 27 December, AD 2002 CVyi7c C/A&&-
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT y * '• ' a — 
FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATS OF UTAH [Incorporation] 
Docket Number 02408808 
[* One definition of "A SECURITY" is "any evidence of debt11 and a Flag in Commerce 
is telling the U.S. S.E.C. that a speculation account is being established to 
enforce a lien, making such a Federal Interest because it could become translated 
into a Security, and become subject to observation, tracking, and regulation by 
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, i.e., U.S. S.E.C.3 
-1-
fcxk>Vt 2-
RETURN OF SERVICE 
EHT 1 2 8 7 6 8 : 2 0 0 4 P6 17 of 35 
Civi l Process Person 
Name: u^Ss K C r/^^c/C 
Address: 
C i ty /S ta t e : 
Service Pee: 
Tracking NO* 7-21-98-D2 
Z/GZ <T / V ^ c -
-C Rev, \J i 
I hereby depose and say that I am a citizen of the United States of America, I am 
over the age of 21 years at the time of service and not a party to or interested 
in this action. That I served a copy of the following documents and offered an 
inspection of the originals in my possession. I placed my endorsement on the copy 
of the documents served. I declare under penalty of perjury that the information 
in this Return of Service is true and correct. 
Served: KARY J. PACE 
At: 1350 East 300 North 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Or other place where served: 
On the f day of SU^iesvihtT , 20 oY 
At the .Hour of a.m. ( } p.m. {r\ Check 
Documents Served: AFFIDAVIT OF NOTICE AND DEMAND, Ttackiixg No. 7-21-98-D1, with: 
Attachment #1 is Admin. Record in 3 Parts and Administrative Judgment AJ-1 7-21-98 
Artachroent #2 is page one and two of Civil Complaint No. 020408808 
Attachment #3 is a copy of ORDER dated 7 January, AD 2004 
Manner of Service 
( s/) I personally served upon: Mary J. Pace 
( ) I left copies thereof at above location with person of suitable age arid 
discretion then therein residing; 
Name of person with whom left: 
Process Server, Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWDRN TO before me this J> day of Sj^tVy\\^^ 20 0 ^  
My Commission Expires: (fh i 20/01 
Residing At: fOG>()/V> 1/AlVf vSlHj 3vg_ 
P.-oiO.uT ^ VGecJ^ j 
Return To: Jerry C. Cooper 
i^Ma'Jp CM? 
-Wl l/Vfrytf 
Notary Public 
(IAtW\ 
Seal 
245 Astro Drive 
Kelso, Washington L986263 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
ANN MARIE MICKELSEN 
1060 N University Avenue 
Provo UT B4604 
My Commission Expires 
March 20,2007 
STATE OF UTAH I 
ENT 1 2 8 7 6 8 : 2 0 0 4 PG 18 of 35 
AFFIDAVIT OF NOTICE AND DEMAND (for Establishment of CLAIMS and OBLIGATIONS) 
NOTICE OF PRIVATE COMMERCIAL AFFIDAVIT 
NOTICE OF NON-JUDICIAL PROCEEDING U.S. Certified Mail Number 
Return Receipt Requested 
NOTICE OF PRE-JUDICIAL PROCEEDING 
Tracking No. 7-21-98-D1 
FAIR NOTICE AND WARNING OF COMMERCIAL GRACE 
RESPONSE REQUIRED FROM 
TEES I S A U . S . S . E . C . TRACER FLAG* EACH RESPONDENT WITHIN 
NOT A. POINT OF LAW, A SECURITY (15 USC) TWENTT-ONE ( 2 1 ) DAIS 
ASSEVERATION; .--M^?: i-
County: G)u,l.fo > l t | 5 & 
the State of ^ s l » , ^ ) p A
 & Wtf^ 
the united States of America ) s ^ ^ g f e ) ^ L f f i g £ * Jurisdiction' ^ S ^ T 
I, Jerry C. Cooper, in correct public capacity as beneficiary to the 
Original Jurisdiction, being of majority in age, competent to testify, self-
realized entities, free man upon the land, ny yes he yes, my no be no, do state 
to the best of piy first hand personal knowledge ana belief that the truths and 
facts herein said are true, correct and complete, and not misleading, in good 
faith, and not in bad faith, under penalty of perjury. 
Certificate of Witness 
I, /Hzjha: Olfe" , certify that I know and can identify 
the signature of Jerry C. Cooper, on the above asseveration, is true and that 
said signature was not signed under duress or undue influence. 
Dated this 3&_ day of /?U#Usf~ , ^ ^ ^ < _ ^ ^ 
AD 2004, at &Al/tl tr} /)A • Third Party Witness 
Personal 
From: Jerry C. Cooper, Record Cfcraer Service If Made: 
Location: 245 Astro Drive f/}Ar^ Pact 
Kelso, Washington [near 98626] te» f (Ojr^ f ^ l ^ 
Time: 3 s 2<^f^\ 
Reference: Date: 
Amended Complaint, 27 December, AD 2002 D^SUCIS/AM 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT y* ! ' l L^j2£ 
FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH [Incorporation] 
Docket Number 02408808 
4c 
[* One definition of "A SECURITy" is "any evidence of debt" and a Flag in Commerce 
is telling the U.S. S.E.C. that a speculation account is being established to 
enforce a lien, making such a Federal Interest because it could become translated 
into a Security, and become subject to observation, tracking, and regulation by 
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, i.e., U.S. S.E.C. J 
-1-
RETURN OP SERVICE 
EHT 1 2 8 7 6 8 : 2 0 0 4 PB 19 of 35 
C i v i l Process Person 
Name: "Nfcc>\ (l iA<£ Tracking NO. 7-21-98-D2 
Address: 1/^2 S /*'/& & 
City/State: 
Service Fee: 
£££ \/2 or 
I hereby depose and say that I am a citizen of the United States of America, I am 
over the* age of 21 years at the time of service and not a party to or interested 
in this action* That I served a copy of the following documents and offered an 
inspection of the originals in my possessicxi. I placed my endorsement on the copy 
of the documents served. I declare under penalty of perjury that the information 
in this Return of Service is true and correct. 
I Served: 'RocUc^ W. fct'^ 
At: Jfefct-^ffr.P.C. 
ty N*ri^  loo £«*f 
fr*v>, UT &H6o% 
Or other place where served: 
On the ~7 £ay of Se^^^u^ 
At the .Hour of , VjT a.m. ( 
20 &</ 
) p.m. fv^ l. Check 
Documents Served: AFFIDAVIT OF NOTICE AND DEMA't£\ Tracking No. 7-21-98-D1, with: 
Attachment #1 is Admin. Record in 3 Parts and £Oministrative Judgment AJ-1 7-21-98 
Attachment #2 is page one and two of Civil Complaint No. 020408808 
Attachment #3 is a copy of ORDER dated 7 January, AD 2004 
I/) 
( ) 
I personally served upon: 
Kanner of Service 
7 I left copies thereof at above location with person of suitable age and 
discretion then therein residing; 
Name of person with whom left: 
o -J? 
Process Server, Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me t h i s J /£^ jday of f<p^£**&^ 
My Commission Expires: ?-!/-?Q0p-
Residing At: /P/ZXn™
 f t/y. __ -
20 r-
Notary Public Seal 
ENT 1 2 8 7 6 8 : 2 0 0 4 PG 20 of 35 
AFFIDAVIT OF NOTICE AKD DEMAND { for Establ i shment o f CLAIMS and OBLIGATIONS) 
NOTICE OP PRIVATE COMMERCIAL AFFIDAVIT 
NOTICE OF NON-JUDICIAL PROCEEDING 
ranCE OF ERE-JUDICEAL PROCEEDING 
FAIR NOTICE AND WARNING OF COMMERCIAL GUVCE 
THIS I S A U . S . S . E . C . TRACER FLAG* 
NOT A.POINT OF LAH, A SECURITY (15 USC) 
ASSEVERATION: 
County: G > u > l f o ) 
the State of VJks/n^^m. ) 
the united States of America ) Benef i d £ a r £ ^ th e Original Jurisdicta 
U.S. Certified Mail Number 
Return Receipt Requested 
Trackiixj No. 7-21-98-D1 
RESPONSE REQUIRED FROM 
EACH RESPONDENT WITHIN 
TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS 
^B^M§& 
L.S. 
ion (J: V,1' 
I, Jerry C. Cooper, in correct public capacity as beneficiary to the 
Original Jurisdiction, being of majority in age, competent to testify, self-
realized entities, free man upon the land, my yes be yes, my no be no, do state 
to the best of py first hand personal knowledge ana belief that the truths and 
facts herein said are true, correct and complete, and not misleading, in good 
faith, and not in bad faith, under penalty of perjury. 
Certificate- of-Witness-
I, AtzJhx Offer* certify that I know and can identify 
the signature of Jerry C. Cooper, on the above asseveration, is true and that 
said signature was not signed under duress or undue influence,. 
Dated this 3j>_ day of /^qfust 
AD 2004, at fai/tiCr. /0& Third Party Witness 
Prom: Jerry C. Cooper, Record Owner 
Location: 245 Astro Drive 
Kelso, Washington-[near 9862S3 
Reference: 
Amended Complaint, 27 December, AD 2002 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH [Incorporation] 
Docket Number 02408808 
Personal 
Service If Made:• 
To: f\z£s\£^ R'V*.r£ 
Time: <£>¥C>^ 
Date: £*f> y ,**-&* Y 
By?: $>CrJ/r G//PZ&. 
[* One definition of "A SECURITY" is "any evidence of debt" and a Flag in Commerce 
is telling the U.S. S.E.C. that a speculation account is being established to 
enforce a lien, making such a Federal Interest because it could becotne translated 
into a Security, and become subject to observation, tracking, and regulation by 
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, i.e., U.S. S.E.C.3 
-1-
KETURN OF SERVICE 
ENT 1 2 8 7 6 8 : 2 0 0 4 PG 21 of 35 
Civil 
Name: 
Address: 
City/State: 
Service Fee: 
Process Person 
Tracking NO. 7-21-98-D2 
I hereby depose and say that I am a citizen of the United States of America, I am 
over the age of 21 years at the time of service and not a party to or interested 
in this action. That I served a copy of the following documents and offered an 
inspection of the originals in my possession. I placed my endorsement on the copy 
of the documents served • I declare under penalty of perjury that the information 
in this Return of Service is true and correct* 
I Served: Hon. LYNN W. DAVIS 
At: % 125 North 100 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Or other place where served: 
On 
At 
the 
the 
- 7 
—A-
.Hour 
day 
of 
of J; a.m. "7 ( ) .. 20_ p.m. p"Tch sck 
Documents Served: AFFIDAVIT OF NOTICE AND DEMAND, Tracking No. 7-21-98-D1, with: 
Attachment #1 is Admin. Recced in 3 Parts and Administrative Judgment AJ-1 7-21-98 
Attachment #2 is page one and two of Civil Complaint No. 020408808 
Attachment #3 is a copy of ORDER dated 7 January, AD 2004 
Banner of Service 
(r/T I personally served upon: Honorable Lynn W. Davis 
) I left copies thereof at above location with person of suitable age and 
discretion then therein residing; 
Name of person with whom left: 
r\.j? 
Process Server, Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me t h i s r r ^ day of 3&fea-&C\— 
My Commission Expires: 3-SI- 1&&- /J*&^"^#£w_ 
Residing At: /ySfefP lAf . 
20 &/ 
Notary Public Seal 
Return To: Jerry C. Cooper 
245 Astro Drive 
Kelsof Washington 198626] 
My Commission Expires 
March 31.2007 
TATE 0~ UTAH 
EKT 138768:2004 PG 22 of 35 
AFFIDAVIT OF NOTICE AND DEMAND (for Establishment of CLAIMS and OBLIGATIONS) 
NOTICE OF PRIVATE COMMERCIAL AFFIDAVIT 
NOTICE OF NON-JUDICIAL PROCEEDING 
NOTICE OF FRE-JUDICIAL PROCEEDING 
FAIR NOTICE AND WARNING OF COMKERCIAL GRACE 
U.S. Certified Mail Number 
Return Receipt Requested 
Tracking No. 7-21-9B-D1 
THIS IS A U.S. S.E.C. TRACER FLAG* 
NOT A.JPOINT OF LAW, A SECURITY (15 USC) 
RESPONSE REQDIRED FROM 
EACH RESPONDENT WITHIN 
TWENTY-ONE ( 2 1 ) DATS 
ASSEVERATION: 
Q**t;fe. County: 
the State of \M&Lf*Jv^ ) 
th e united States cf America ) 
Benefii 
LR L.S. 
•tp> th e Original Jurisdiction <£3£££> 
I, Jerry C. Cooper, in correct public capacity as beneficiary to the 
Original Jurisdiction, being of majority in age, competent to testify, self-
realized entities, free man upon the land, my yes te yes, my no be no, do state 
to the best of rny first hand personal knowledge ana belief that the truths B.nd 
facts herein said are true, correct and complete, and not misleading, in good 
faith, and not in bad faith, under penalty of perjury • 
Certificate of--Witness 
I, McJb* 01**" certify that I know and can ident i fy 
the signature of Jerry C. Cooper, on the above asseveration, i s true and that 
said signature was not signed under duress or undue influence* 
Dated th i s j?£_ day of /)ufU$f~ , j^??2cw££e 
AD 2004, at /&?//?/Vr, /)& Ihird Party Witness 
Personal 
Service I f Made: 
To: JL V/>n Uc^s,S 
Time: 3 7 o S* &*? 
Date: $^o y, Z<^ > y* 
3y: ^ £ ^ CCA/lK 
From: Jerry C, Cooper, Record 0**ner 
Location: 245 Astro Drive 
Kelso, Washington-[near 98626] 
Reference: 
Amended Complaint, 21 December, AD 2002 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH [Incorporation] 
Docket Number 02408808 
[* One definition of "A SECURITY" is "any evidence of debt" and a Flag in Commerce 
is telling the U.S. S.E.C. that a speculation account is being established to 
enforce a lien, making such a Federal Interest because it could become translated 
into a Security, and become subject to observation, tracking, and regulation by 
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, i.e., U.S. S.E.C.] 
-1-
RETURN OF SERVICE 
EHT l E S 7 & a : 2 Q 0 4 PG 23 of 35 
C iv i l Process Person 
Name: f »bk Ut'' Tracking NO. ^ - 2 l - ? S ^ ^ 
Address: )Ui£> T/yycrS T)r~ 
City/State: ^W^w , £ # , 
Service Fee: 
I hereby depose and say that I am a citizen of the United States of America, I am 
over the-age of 21 years at the time of service and not a party to or interested 
in this action. That I served a copy of the following documents and offered an 
inspection of the originals in my possession. I placed my endorsement on the copy 
of the documents served. I declare under penalty of perjury that the information 
in this Return of Service is true and correct. 
I Served: RtC«A&t> \Af.P*C£ 
Or other place where served: 
9P t h e ^ d*y of flcMf*- , 20 QL\ . 
At the-Hour of Q '. ZP a.m. ( } p.m. ( V ) Check 
Cocuments Served: jo&Ti^ &F ^ L ^ T T H C J ^ fOp. > 2 h IB***, w i ^ O p ' t i *f l & K ' f *$ 
Manner of Service 
( ) 1 personal ly served upon: 
( } I l e f t copies thereof a t above loca t ion with person of su i tab le age and 
d i s c r e t i o n then therein r e s id ing ; 
Name of person with whom l e f t : 
N 2 1 I £ E OF F A U L T ENT 1 2 8 7 & 8 : 2 0 0 4 PG 2* of 35 
NOTICE OF COMMERCIAL GRACE 
NOTICE OF NON-JUDICIAL PROCEEDING 
NOTICE OF PRE-JUDICIAL PROCEEDING 
U.S. Certified Hail Number 
Return Receipt Requested 
Tracking No. 7-21-9S-E1 
TO: RICHARD W. PACE, 1350 E, 300 No. 
MARY J. PACE, 1350 E. 300 No. 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
RODNEY W. RIVERS, 497 No. 800 E 
Lindon, Utah B4042 
LYNN W. DAVIS, Judge, 125 No. 100 W. 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Respondents 
ASSEVERATION: 
NOTICE: Commercial F a u l t Must .'-Be 
C o r r e c t e d Within Three ( 3 } Days 
THIS IS A U .S . S . E . C . TRACER FLAG 
NOT A POINT OF LAW, 
A SECURITY (15 USC) 
(cH*>lrfi r£2_ County: _ 
the State of (Pa's In 
) 
* # = _ 
the un i t ed Sta tes of America ) Benef! o t he io r ig ina l J u r i s d i c t i o n 
I , J e r ry C. Cooper, in cor rec t public capaci ty as beneficiary to the O r i g i n a l 
J u r i s d i c t i o n , being of majority in age, competent to t e s t i f y , s e l f - r e a l i z e d e n t i t i e s , 
free man upon the land, my yes be yes, my no be no, do s t a t e to the best of my f i r s t 
hand personal knowledge and be l i e f tha t the t r u t h s and fac t s herein said a r e t r u e , 
cor rec t and complete, and not misleading, presented in good f a i t h and not i n bad 
f a i t h , under penalty of perjury. 
C e r t i f i c a t e of W i t n e s s 
, ce r t i fy t ha t I know and can ident i fy the 
s i g n a t u r e ' o f Jerry <S7 Cooper, on the above assevera t ion , i s t rue and tha t s a i d 
s igna ture was not sighed under duress or undue inf luence . 
Bated t h i s ^ / ^ d a y of^ ^^^Z^t^C^, AD 2004 
Prom: 
Third t'arty Witness 
Jerry C. Cooper, Record Owner 
Location: 245 Astro Drive 
Kelso, Washington state [98626] 
Reference: 
Amended Complaint, 27 December, AD 2003 
FOURTH^JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH [Incorporation] 
Docket Number 02408308 
Personal 
Service If Made:-
Time: 
By: Cht'th L/iS 
NOTICE OF FAULT 
Timely Private Notice of Cooditioa af CaaEoeixrial Fault for 
Failure to Respond to AFFIDAVIT OF NOTICE AND DEMAND. 
-1-
„«-*r ^» «_*»
 t ^/ 
RETURN OF SERVICE 
ENT 1 2 8 7 6 8 : 2 0 0 4 PS 25 of 35 
1 Process Perspr Civ i l r  rs n 
Name: Tracking NO. 1 - 2 1 - 9 8 - ^ 1 -
Address: llrfcT^rJ* 7V 
C i t y / S t a t e : 0 - J L ^ Uff, 
Service Fee: 
I hereby depose and say tha t I am a c i t i z e n of the United Sta tes of America, 1 am 
over the .age of 21 years a t the time of s e r v i c e and not a party to or i n t e r e s t e d 
in t h i s a c t i on . That I served a copy of the following documents and offered an 
inspec t ion of the o r i g i n a l s in ray possess ion . I placed my endorsement on t h e copy 
of the documents served. I declare under penal ty of perjury tha t the informat ion 
in t h i s Return of Service i s t rue and c o r r e c t . 
I Served: f(\KQ\ St PAC£ 
At: VKo &#k ^ ° 0 Nw** 
Or other place where served: 
On .the n K day of QfULt/ , 20 Qt/ . 
At the.Bour of lj'. 70 a.m. ( ) p.m. (^) Qieck 
Documents Served: ^CrT\C£ c% ^ ^ " T h a c K i ^ th>. -}~2\~ ?£-£{, vvt^ oapfe* *f *£*?v<*n *? 
Manner of Service 
( } I personally served upon: 
( ) I left copies thereof at above location with person of suitable age and 
discretion then therein residing; 
Name of person with whom left: 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 
My Commission Expires: 
Residing At: \\JrrJL. CAt.*-<$Z'. 
Return To: 
JOSEPH E. TAYLOR 
Mmpm-sTmofm 
m 415 NORTH STATE ST 
OHEM, UT 84057 
COMM. EXP. 4-20-2005 
N O T I C E O F F A U L T 
ENT 128768:200-4 PG 26 of 35 
NOTICE OF COMMERCIAL GRACE 
NOTICE OF NON-JUDICIAL PROCEEDING 
NOTICE OF PRE-JUDICIAL PROCEEDING 
U.S. Certified Mail Number 
Return Receipt Requested 
Tracking No, 7-21-98-EL 
TO: RICHARD W. PACE, 1350 E, 300 No. 
MARY J , PACE, 1350 E. 300 No. 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
RODNEY W. RIVERS, 497 No. 800 E 
Lindon, Utah 84042 
LYNN W. DAVIS, Judge, 125 No. 100 W. 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Respondents 
ASSEVERATION: 
NOTICE: Commerc ia l F a u l t M u s t . B e 
C o r r e c t e d W i t h i n T h r e e ( 3 ) Days 
THIS IS A U . S . S . E . C . TRACER FLAG 
NOT A POINT OF LAW, 
A SECURITY (15 USC) 
County: (Vlrfa ) 
the State of (Oaslii/^tP^ 
the united States of America ) BenefS^ipi^Ao thetOriginal Jurisdiction 
I, Jerry C. Cooper, in correct public capacity as beneficiary to the Original 
Jurisdiction, being of majority in age, competent to testify, self-realized entities, 
free man upon the land, my yes be yes, my no be no, do state to the best of my first 
hand personal knowledge and belief that the truths and facts herein said are true, 
correct and complete, and not misleading, presented in good faith and not in bad 
faith, under penalty of perjury. 
Certificate of Witness 
, certify 
iture of Jerry Qfi Cooper, on the above 
that I know and can identify the 
signatu Ti C oper, on the above asseveration, is true and that said 
signature was not signed under duress or undue influence. 
Dated this*? f^*day of^ ^ ^^Z^t^<>ft AD 2004, 
\tdLc**^£*<£ \r 
From: Jerry C. Cooper, Recorti Owoer 
Location: 245 Astro Drive 
Kelso, Washington s t a t e [98626] 
Reference: 
Amended Complaint, 27 December, AD 2003 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH [Incorporation] 
Docket Number 02408803 
NOTICE OP FAULT 
Third "Party Witness 
personal 
Service If Maae: 
Time: 
Date: W- flL C?V 
TiiDsly Private Notice of Conditiop of Commercial Fault for 
Failure to Respond to AFFIDAVIT OF KDTICE AND DEMAND. 
-1-
&LM><1 1 
RETURN OF SERVICE 
ENT 1 2 8 7 6 8 - . S 0 0 4 PG 27 of 35 
Civi l Process Persoa 
Name: £V,y l \ *-A n 
Address: Iflfa Tj^rt^r/ "£>/-
C i t y / S t a t e : &ry ]*\ 
Tracking NO. y 2 l - 9 S ^ £ l » 
Service Fee: 
•ML 
I hereby depose and say tha t I am a c i t i z e n of the United Sta tes of America, I am 
over the age of 21 years a t the time of s e rv i ce and not a party to or i n t e r e s t e d 
in t h i s a c t i o n . That I served a copy of the following documents and offered an 
inspec t ion of t he o r i g i n a l s in my possession- I placed my endorsement on t h e copy 
of the documents served. I declare under penalty of perjury tha t the information 
in t h i s Return of Service i s t rue and c o r r e c t . 
I Served: £>]»o£M \N RiVCfrS 
At: ;f<£fT* * JfcfTS 
?n*v} {XT &HUTS 
Or o ther p lace where servea: 
Cn 
At 
the 
t h e . 
D:*^ day < 
_Hour of 3^ '.vr a.m. ( ) 
.. 20. 
p-m 
on 
Check 
Documents Served: |gcrnc£ 0\ • f lkn^Tfacfc^ No. "?-2|- ?&-£ ' / \ M ' ^ oop<'tt *f ^ „ f « •$ 
( ) 
1 personally served upon: 
Manner of Service 
Pod** 9-
I left copies thereof at above location with person of suitable age and 
discretion then therein residing; 
Name of person with whom left: 
s-r_ 
Process Server, Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before roe t h i s J j ^ f c d a y o t / D c ? t ^ i U \ 
My Commission Expires : *^ XOIo5* 
9hJL (SL J b C T • Notary Publ 
.*
 2
°oj£_ 
Residing At: 
Return To: 
-fgffc, JOSEPH E.TAYLOR I 
(IfMm MMfMUS'SmEHUUlH 
™ffl 4 1 5 HO™ STATE ST 
VfivOV OREM.UT 94057 
COMM. EXP. 4-20-7nns 
E21I£z OF LAULl 
NOTICE OF COMMERCIAL GRACE 
ENT 1 8 8 7 6 8 : 2 0 0 4 TO Eft of 35 
NOTICE OF NON-JUDICIAL PROCEEDING 
NOTICE OF PREJUDICIAL PROCEEDING 
TO: RICHARD H. PACE, 1350 E, 300 No. 
MARY J . PACE, 1350 E. 300 No. 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
RODNEY W. RIVERS, 497 No. 800 E 
Lindon, Utah 84042 
LYNN W. DAVIS, Judge, 125 No. 100 W. 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Respondents 
U.S. C e r t i f i e d Mai l Number 
R e t u r n R e c e i p t R e q u e s t e d 
T r a c k i n g N o . 7-21-98-E1 
NOTICE: Commercial Fault Must .'Be 
Corrected Within Three (3) Days 
THIS IS A U.S. S.E.C. TRACER FLAG 
NOT A POINT OF LAW, 
A SECURITY (15 USC) 
ASSEVERATION: 
iVlrfa County: _ 
the State of tPttsLlv^fpH 
the u n i t e d S ta te s of America ) .o thelOriginal Jurisdiction 
I, Jerry C. Cooper, in correct public capacity as beneficiary to the Original 
Jurisdiction, being of majority in age, competent to testify, self-realized entities, 
free man upon the land, my yes be yes, my no be no, do state to the best of my first 
hand personal knowledge and belief that the truths and facts herein said are true, 
correct and complete, and not misleading, presented in good faith and not in bad 
faith, under penalty of perjury * 
Certificate of Witness 
:,*>22~^ /Z&JL^ , &+<-* , certify that I know and can identify the 
signature'of Jerry <?T Cooper, on the above asseveration, is true and that said 
signature was not signed under duress or undue influence* 
Dated this^f^day of^ ^ ^JcZ^tJU^, .AD 2004, L" 
r£L ird Tarty Witness 
From: Jerry C. Cooper, Record Owner 
Location: 245 Astro Drive 
Kelso, Washington state [98626] 
Reference: 
Amended Complaint, 27 December, AD 2003 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH [Incorporation] 
Docket Number 02408B03 
Personal 
Service If Made: 
-ZotirrL^ ft/rtr\ 
Time: 7 ', V<T f»* 
N3TIC5 OP FAULT 
Timely Private Notice of Coaditiao of Commercial Fault for 
Failure to Respond to AFFIDAVIT OF NOTICE AND DEMAND. 
-1-
£>:JvT*T C? 
RETURN OF SERVICE 
Civi l Process Person 
Name: c r . y K / /CA 
EHT 1 2 8 7 6 8 : 3 0 0 4 PS 29 of 35 
Tracking NO- ^ 2 1 - ^ 8 ^ ^ 
Address: Mfcfi T>v^C*L 
C i t y / S t a t e : 0\ 
Service Fee: 
r*'*j tir 
2h 
I hereby depose and say that I am a citizen of the United States of America, I am 
over the-age of 21 years at the tiioe of service and not a party to or interested 
in this action. That I served a copy of the foUowixxj documents and offered an 
inspection of the originals in my possession. I placed my endorsement on the copy 
of the documents served. I declare under penalty of perjury that the information 
in this Return of Service is true and correct. 
I Served: f-U»vt>W*k L^tN^ WT>^V1^ 
Or other place where served: 
On 
At 
the 
the. 
Il+K day 
Hour of 
of 
HO a.m. { ) 
_, 20 Ql} 
p.m. i^) Check 
Documents Served: N C T I C £ ^ ^ o L T p f a c f c ^ fOo. ?-2W <fR^t/ \ M ^ ooffe* *f 1 & K ^ J 
( ) 
Manner of Service 
(/\ ) I personally served upon: '^uohjj / u^^ l&ts/'s 
I left copies thereof at above lecatii 
discretion then therein residing; 
Name of person with whom left: 
ion with person of suitable age and 
• ^ / ^ 
Process Server/Affiant 
t-
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me t h i s ^ 7 ^ day off Q c 4 > & ~ ^ , 20 0 ^ 
My Coatmission Expires 
Residing At: \A4~*A 
Return To: 
t s ^ 
.JOSEPH E TAYLOR 
415 NORTH STATE ST 
GREW, UT 84057 
COMM EXP. 4-20-2005 
K O 1 1 £ E O F F A U L T
 W12S7&S : 2 0 0 4 W5 30 of 
NOTICE OF COMMERCIAL GRACE 
NOTICE OF NON-JUDICIAL PROCEEDING 
NOTICE OF PREJUDICIAL PROCEEDING 
TO: RICHARD W. PACE, 1350 E, 300 No. 
MARY J . PACE, 1350 E. 300 No. 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
RODNEY W. RIVERS, 497 No. 800 E 
Lindon, Utah 84042 
LYNN W. DAVIS, Judge, 125 No. 100 W. 
Provo, Utah 84501 
Respondents 
U . S . C e r t i f i e d Mai l Number 
R e t u r n R e c e i p t R e q u e s t e d 
T r a c k i n g No, 7-21-98-E1 
NOTICE:'Commercial Fault Must .'Be 
Corrected Within Three (3) Days 
THIS IS A U.S. S.E.C. TRACER FLAG 
NOT A POINT OF LAW, 
A SECURITY (15 USC) 
ASSEVERATION; 
County: fVlrte 
the S t a t e of tQ«S Lr*sripH 
the u n i t e d Sta tes of America* ) BsnefSQi^^Ao thelQrig: Original J u r i s d i c t i o n 
I r J e r r y C. Cooper, in cor rec t public capaci ty as beneficiary to the Or ig ina l 
J u r i s d i c t i o n , being of majority in age, competent to t e s t i f y , s e l f - r e a l i z e d e n t i t i e s , 
free man upon the land, my yes be yes, my no be no, do s t a t e t o the bes t of my f i r s t 
hand personal knowledge and be l i e f tha t the t r u t h s and fac t s herein sa id a r e t r u e , 
cor rec t and complete, and not misleading,, presented in good f a i th and not i n bad 
f a i t h , under penalty of perjury. 
C e r t i f i c a t e of W i t n e s s 
, ce r t i fy 
aire* of Jer ry <?7 Cooper, on the above 
t h a t I know and can ident i fy the 
signatur    d ,  t   assevera t ion , i s t rue and tha t s a i d 
s igna tu re was not signed under duress or undue inf luence . 
Dated this*? f^day of_ ^ ^ ^ r t ^ > f t .AD 2004 ,^  
S ^ £ ^ third "Party Witness 
From: Jerry C. Cooper, Record Owner 
Location: 245 Astro Drive 
Kelso, Washington state [986263 
Reference: 
Amended Complaint, 27 December, AD 2003 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE QF UTAH [Incorporation] 
Docket Number 02408808 
Personal 
Service If Made: • 
To: W y IVA/)'*; 
Time: 1'MO #*+ . 
Date: JQ-IZ-M 
By: L , T ^ L'i * 
NOTICE: OF FAULT 
Timely Private Notice of Condition of CcmDercial Fault for 
Failure to Respond to AFFIDAVIT OP IK7TICE AND DEMAND. 
£J»'U °i 
EHT 1 2 ^ 7 6 8 : 2 0 0 4 PG 31 of 35 
m 
n-
o 
a 
a 
a 
a 
m 
• 
US-Postal Service™ 
CERTIFIED MAIL™ RECEIPT-
(Domestic Mail Only; No insurance Coverage Provided) 
rorttelivery information visit our wabsiteat www.usps.cami, 
n e c „ 
WFRTfflW FIW-.UI 
L 
Postage 
Certified Fee 
Return Redept Foe 
(Endorsement Requirod) 
Restricted Delivery Fee 
(Endorsement Required) 
Total Postage & Fees 
* j 3.13 
P..TB 
1.75 
$ 7.18 
UNIT ID: 0373 
Postmark 
Her* 
Clerk: KWTHO 
10/26/04 
erPOBtxAta. 135JJ &.. JJO N . 
PS fT0Tm3I0D. June20Q2 Sectfteverse lor intttuclto*m' 
JSefllEHiI^aJRtHIETi^^e^^W 
Complete items 1, 2, and 3. Also complete 
item 4 if Restricted Delivery is desired. 
Print your name and address on the reverse 
so that we can return the card to you. 
Attach this card to the back of the maiipiece, 
or on the front if space permits. 
1. A^ticte Addressed to: 
/W- . flirt, O^T 
imtmzmrmmzTmnxmmuvERY 
|""D. fevdelivery address different from Hem^ ? Q Yes 
If YES, enter delivery address below. D No 
D Addressee / 
. Becerved by ( PnfadfUi lame) 
3 Service Type 
S Certified Mafl Q Express Mai! 
D Registered D Return Receipt for Merchandise 
D Insured Mail D C O D 
4 Restncted Delivery? ^Ertra Fee) D Yes 
2. Article Number 
{Transfer from service isbef) 70D3 ID ID DODM 1731 aMMb 
PS Form 3811 ; August 2001 I Domestic Return Receipt J i j \\\ 1025S5^2-M-1540 
£xK\fcxT \" 
EHT 1 2 8 7 6 8 : S 0 0 4 PG 32 of 35 
-USTpostel^SfiivJcetB—— '' — 
H CERTIFIED MAIL™ RECEIPT 
^ (Domestic Mall Only; No Insurance VoveragB Provided) 
m 
• 
o 
a 
r-3 
a 
m 
a 
a 
Fortielivcry infonnatiaii visrtoirr website at wwwaispsxom* 
tffigf FIB^JCXA L U 
3.13 
Certified F M 
Return Rectept Fee 
(Endorsement Required) 
Restricted Defivwy Fee 
(Ettka-Bernent Required) 
Total Postage & Fees 
_2J2_ 
1.75 
$ 7.18 
UWT ID: 0373 
Postmark 
Clert: KWTHO 
10/26/W 
or PO Box No. J 3 J Z ) b • 5 0 0 JS [ % 
cwjv&ate;2^HT"^ ; *~"~~ ™ <T7T7 
VSVorm 38DD, Junc2002 S e c Reverse tor instructions 
LENDER: mtmPWm^FHB SECTION 
Complete items 1,2, and 3. Aiso complete 
Item A rf Restricted Delivery is desired. 
Pnnt your name and address on the reverse 
so that we can return the card to you. 
Attach thts card to the back of the rnailpiece, 
or on the front tf space permits. 
XDMPlETETHlSJzLUUDNDNBEUVEnY 
1, ArOcie Aaaressed to. 
rWf J- Pom 
K Signal 
D Agent / 
Addressee ^y I / (pH^OL&f l/£s [/Z&Q ^ 
R&ceJved oy (Printed Name) f) j C/ Bate of deliver) 
D. Is delivery address different from item 17* Q Ves y 
Jf YES, enter delivery address beJow; D No 
3. Service Type 
OH Certified Mall 
D Registered 
G Insured Mai! 
D Express Mail 
• Return Receipt to- Merchanaise 
u c.o.a 
4. Restncted Delivery? (Extra Fee) D Yes 
2. Artide Number 
(Transfer from sarvice labef) 7003 1010 DDD4 1731 &HhQ 
PS Form 3 8 1 1 , August 2001 Domestic Return Receipt 102595-C2-M-1540 
£xki U i i 
ENT 1 2 8 7 6 8 : 2 0 0 4 P6 33 of 35 
m 
m 
o 
a 
• 
a 
a 
m 
a 
r> 
^JST^jstal-ServffiBTO————•-- , 
CERTIFIED MAIL™ BECEIPT 
(Domestic MallVnfy; No fnsursmce Ztovemge Pnovktetl) 
3fior delivery information visitaur wet site at wwwoispsxom 
BSOCIAL 0 
Postage 
Certified Foe 
Return Redept Fee 
(Endorsement Required) 
Restricted Delivery Fee 
(Endorsement Required) 
Total Postage & Fees 
$ 
$ 
3.13 . 
2.30 
1.75 
7.1B J 
UNIT IB; 0373 
Postmark 
Hers 
Cleric: KVHTHO 
10/26/M 
Sent To 
OTPOBOXNO. k J e r b V J t £ i ^ _ N N. loo E"-
Pro-jo, Ui i^<3> 
PSFonrf3tD0rJune:2DD2 See Reverse for Instructions 
I SENDER: T&MPI&ETHISSECT&N 
Complete ftems 1, 2, and 3. Aiso complete 
item 4 if Restricted Delivery is desired. 
Print your name and address on the reverse 
so that we can return the card to you. 
Attach thts card to the back of the mallptece, 
or on the front if space permits. 
ixxnmsizTHmmcmNaNis&ivmY 
1. Article Addressed to* 
50 H. t°Q fe * 
POM, ^ T H ^ 3 
A Signature . 
x f t r7>Wl D Agent D Addressee 
B-. Received byi Printed Name) | C. Date of Delivery 
D. Is delivery address 
If YES, enter 
;emi? n\es 
DNo 
3. Service Type \ ^ , Q ~prT N (Y/ / 
©'Certified Mail O Exprwo-Mall 
G Registerea D Return Receipt for Merchandise 
• insured Mail • C.O.D. 
4. Restricted Delivery? ^r t ra Fee) DYes 
2. Articie Number 
(Transfer /rem serv/ce febe/? 7DD3 1D1D DQ0<< 1731 S4S3 
PS Form 38l i1 JAugiist 2001 j | | i i Domestic Return Receipt' Hi 11 i i 11 i 102595-O2-M-!5<0 
ENT 1 2 8 7 6 8 : 2 0 0 4 PG 34 of 35 
U.S. Postal Service 
ia=H i iHto ra/atrReaapT—————-— 
(Domestic Mail Dnty; No Insurance Coverage Provided) 
ru 
H 
JQ 
tr 
rr 
ru 
a 
a 
• 
a 
I T 
r=* 
HI 
H 
a 
a 
r^  
, 1 AoP.I A L S E 
Postage 
Certified Fee 
Return Receipt Fee 
(Endorsement Required) 
Restricted Delivery Fee 
(Endorsement Required) 
Total Postage & Fees 
$ 
$ 
•' 2.67 
2.30 i 
1.75 
6.72 
UNIT IB: 03ZJ 
Postmark 
. Hen 
Cleric: KWTHO 
10/26/04 
Sent To 
K tin, ' *V* '"""" I 
PS Form 3B00, January .20D1 -See Reverse lor Instructions 
5EMDER:rDA^PirTETH/53ECT/DW 
• Complete items 1, 2, and 3. Also complete 
Mem 4 if Restricted Delivery is desired. 
• Print your name and address on the reverse 
so that we can return the card to you. 
• Attach this card to the back of the malipiece, 
or on the front if space permits. 
I XZ)M>J£WTHm3S£CimNZ)N3mJUBiY 
Oavij ,J«&f 
1. Article Addressed to: 
ZHoi 
• Agent 
D Addressee 
A. Signature 
D. Is delivery address different from item 1 ? D Yes 
If YES, enter delivery address below: D No 
3. Service Type 
E'Certrfied Mall 
• Registered 
D Insured Mai! 
• Express Mall 
• Return Receipt for Merchandise 
D C.O.D. 
4. Restricted Delive'y? (Extra Fee) D Yes 
2. Article Number 
(TrEnsf&r from service label) 7001 H ID DDD2 =3=11=1 S11B 
PS Form 3 8 1 1 , August 2001 Domestic Return Receipt 10259&-O2-M-154O 
ENT 1 2 8 7 6 8 : 2 0 0 4 PG 35 of 35 
CERTIFICATE OF CONTENTS AND MAILING 
I, CMeSuC L.JpAtr . certify on the £kmday of Q o u W 
AD 2004, I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of Declaration 
and Notice of DEFAULT, DISHONOR and DECISION, Tracking No*7-21-98-Fl, 
with Exhibits 1. through and including 8., as copies of proof of ser-r 
vice, to-the,following persons at the addresses shown, by prepaid 
first class U.S. mail, as follows: 
RICHARD W* PACE, 
1350 East 300 North, American Fork, Utah 84003 
CERTIFIED MAIL; RETURN RECEIPT # l-qoZ \DlO OOOH l ^ l g H ^ 
MARY J* PACE, 
1350 E a s t 300 N o r t h , Amer i can F o r k , Utah 84003 
CERTIFIED MAIL, RETURN RECEIPT f ^0&>1 /DiDoooM R?f &^&>0 
RODNEY W. RIVERS, 
497 North 800 East, Lindon, Utah 84042 
CERTIFIED MAIL, RETURN RECEIPT # 1-QDl iOlO D ^ H PBf g ^ 5 3 
LYNN W. DAVIS, Judge, 
% 125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
CERTIFIED KAIL, RETURN RECEIPT # loftl DHf) OOOZ 9941 5i°{?~ 
GOVERNOR OF UTAH, % Attorney General for the STATE OF UTAH 
Utah State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
OSfcrifiET> (A/\|Ut fc£TUP*J R£C£;pr# ^ O Q 3 \o!Q QQoq nz>[ fr^ 
»/
 r , A ,t a. ^ Third Party/Witness and Server 
Address 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY Or UTAH 
I THE UNDERSH3NED RECORDER Of UTAH COUNTY, UTAH 
DO HEREBY CERTIFY THATTHE ANNEXEDAKD F0REQCHN3 ISA 
TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL RECORDED DOCUMENT W THE 
OFFICE RECOffl INJY.OFFJCE AS THE SAME APPEARS « 
FKTRY /r^X7&/r , PAS=S y3£> 
• K O r . V / / : g g ^ ^ ^ ATPAfiF. 
WITIEfeMlHAND AND SEAL OF SAID O F F T C E T H i O ^ . 
, lANClALLA^COVHOT RECORDER _ . / 
Addendum D 
INSTRUCTION NO. 37 
In order for you to find the Defendant guilty of the offense of WRONGFUL 
LIEN, as charged in Count 1 you must find that each of the following essential 
elements of the crime charged in the Information have been established beyond 
a reasonable doubt: 
1. That the Defendant, Richard Cooper, 
2. On or about January 24, 2007, 
3. In Utah County, Utah, 
4. Did knowingly, 
5. Make, utter, record or file; 
6. A lien; 
7. Having no objectively reasonable basis to believe he had a present 
lawful property interest in the property or claim on the assets. 
If the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction beyond a 
reasonable doubt any one or more of the essential elements of the crime 
charged, you should find the Defendant not guilty. But if the State has proved 
to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt all of the essential elements 
of the offense as set forth above, then you should find the Defendant guilty 
of the offense charged in the Information. 
INSTPUCTION NO -^2> 
In order for you to find the Defendant guilty of the offense o£ WRONGFUL 
LIEN, as charged in Count 2 you must find that each of the following essential 
elements of the crime charged in the Information have been established beyond 
a reasonable doubt: 
1. That the Defendant, Richard Cooper, 
2. On or about January 24, 2037, 
3. In Utah County, Utah, 
4. Did knowingly, 
5. Make, utter, record or file; 
6. A lien; 
7. Having no objectively reasonable basis to believe he had a present 
lawful property interest in the property or claim on the assess. 
If the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction beyond a 
reasonable doubt any one or more of the essential elements of the crime 
charged, you should find the Defendant not guilty. But if the State has proved 
zo your satisfaction beyond a reasonable douot all of the essential elements 
of tne offense as set forth above, then you should find the Defendant guilty 
of the offense charged m the Information. 
\j i > *>** *•' • 
INSTRUCTION NO. 39 
In order for you to find the Defendant guilty of the offense of WRONGFUL 
LIEN, as charged m Count 3 you must find that each of the following essential 
elements of the crime charged in the Information have been established beyond 
a reasonable douiDt: 
1. That the Defendant, Richard Cooper, 
2. On or about January 24, 2007, 
3. In Utah County, Utah, 
4. Did knowingly, 
5. Make, utter, record or file; 
6. A lien; 
7. Having no objectively reasonable basis to believe he had a present 
lawful property interest in the property or claim on the ass^zs. 
If the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction beyond a 
reasonable doubt any one or more of the essential elements of the crime 
charged, you should find the Defendant not guilty. But if the State has proved 
to your satisfaction beyond a reasonaole ooubt all of the essential elements 
of the offense as set forth above, then you should find the Defendant guilty 
of the offense charaed m the Information. 
\s v/ ^y <—' v-r ~J 
INSTRUCTION NO. yo 
In order for you to find the Defendant guilty of the offense of WRONGFUL 
LIEN, as charged in Count 4 you must find that each of the following essential 
elements of the crime charged in the Information have been established beyond 
a reasonable doubt: 
1. That the Defendant, Richard Cooper, 
2. On or about January 24, 2007, 
3. In Utah County, Utah, 
4. Did knowingly, 
5. Make, utter, record or file; 
6. A lien; 
7. Having no objectively reasonable basis to believe he had a present 
lawful property interest in the property or claim on the assets. 
If the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction beyond a 
reasonable doubt any one or more of the essential elements of the crime 
charged, you should find the Defendant not guilty. But if the State has proved 
+-Q TTQIJV- satisfaction bexrcnd a reasonable doubt all of the essential elements 
of the offense as set forth above, then you should find the Defendant guilty 
of the offense charged in the Information. 
000961 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4/ 
S7^ 
As referred to in Instruction No. *3y*flfQregarding the elements of or wrongful lien: 
A "lien" for purposes of the charge of Wrongful Lien is defined as either: 
a. "any instrument or document that creates or purports to create a lien or 
encumbrance on an owner's interest in real or personal property; or 
b. any document that purports to creates a lien, notice of interest, or encumbrance on 
an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it is recorded or filed is 
not: 
(i) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute; 
(ii) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent 
jurisdiction in the state; or 
(iii) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of real 
property. 
000362 
INSTRUCTIONS NO. 
_£<0\ 
37;3g,3?W#> As referred to in Instruction No. regarding the elements ' D " 
of a wrongful lien: 
Under Utah law, communication of a record to the filing office and tender of the filing 
fee or acceptance of the record by the filing office constitutes fU 
000963 
f3 
jg^* regarding the 
INSTRUCTION NO 
As referred to in Instruction No 
elements of a wrongful lien. 
A "objectively reasonable basis" means viewing the facts and circumstances in light of 
common sense and ordinary human experience available to a man or woman of reasonable 
caution and belief. 
O ^ O I h A 
Addendum E 
INSTRUCTION NO. &T 
You are instructed that the testimony of Judge Lynn Davis should be received and given the 
same consideration as you give to that of any other witness. The fact that he is a district court judge 
does not make him different than any other witness. His testimony in this case was as a person and 
not an expert, as such, he is subject to the same considerations you would consider in addressing any 
witness's testimony. His testimony should be/woigh me same as you weigh the testimony of any 
other witness. 
0C0349 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2-*f 
A judgment entered in a district court does not create a lien upon or affect the title to real property 
unless the judgment is filed in the Registry of Judgments of the office of the clerk of the district court 
of the county in which the property is located ; and is recorded in the office of the county recorder 
in which the real property of the judgment debtor is located. 
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